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Foreword 
The environmental compatibility of human activities depends to a large ex- 
tent on the efficiency in the use of energy, basic materials, capital, and other 
factor inputs in both production and consumption. Improved efficiency may 
thus alleviate many adverse impacts and enhance the environmental com- 
patibility of human actions. However, another important factor is efficiency 
in the use of time. In 1987 global COz emissions from fossil energy use were 
about 5.7 Gt carbon. The transport sector accounts currently for some 1.2 
Gt carbon emissions annually, or for slightly less than 25 percent of global 
energy-related C 0 2  emissions. Perhaps more important than the absolute 
magnitude of the emissions is the vigorous growth of transportation demand 
in both developed and developing countries even in periods of rising energy 
prices. 
In this report Arnulf Griibler and NebojSa NakiCenoviC develop a scenario 
for future developments in the transport sector and their implications for 
energy demand. In developing a comprehensive mode-space-time coverage 
of the evolution of transport systems, the analysis indicates that present 
transport systems are approaching a number of limits: market saturation in 
leading countries and an increasing awareness of the social and environmental 
disbenefits associated with a further intensification in the use of present-day 
oil-based transport systems. The report describes an innovative scenario 
from a historical perspective, taking into account a number of institutional 
and physical constraints to  significant future increases in the car population 
and air travel demand at the global level. The scenario challenges the more 
conventional approaches in projecting future developments in the transport 
sector, often based on econometric analysis or income and price elasticities. 
These approaches usually result in very high growth rates of future transport 
systems perhaps indicating the inappropriateness of these methods for long- 
term projections. 
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The saturation scenario outlined in conjunction with further efficiency 
improvements in the transport sector holds important implications for fu- 
ture energy demand profiles and the resulting environmental impacts a t  the 
local, regional, and global level. Energy demand for transportation in OECD 
countries may even decline, while it continues to rise in centrally planned 
(or now, reforming) and developing economies. The overall increase in the 
energy demand for transportation in the scenario is, however, significantly 
lower than in most other energy studies. As such the scenario illustrates 
a possible future in which a worldwide homogenization of life styles and 
resource consumption levels along past energy and resource-intensive devel- 
opment trajectories of industrialized countries would not take place. Given 
that appropriate policies are implemented, a transition toward a more sus- 
tainable development path in the transport sector may thus not only be 
feasible, but also be consistent with historical experience. 
However, the scenario does not indicate a permanent stagnation in the 
demand for transportation fuel in the long term, but rather a transition 
from the forthcoming saturation of current transport technologies to the 
introduction of a new generation of more productive systems. Their pro- 
ductivity will have to be defined not only in terms of more efficient use of 
economic resources and time, but also with respect to  their environmen- 
tal impacts. With current concerns about global environmental change the 
report is of interest in that i t  provides a contrast to conventional wisdom 
and illustrates alternative scenarios developed within the Environmentally 
Compatible Energy Strategies (ECS) Project at IIASA. 
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Abstract 
Technological change in all areas of economic and social activities has been a 
major determinant of development. With advances in technology it is possi- 
ble to provide entirely new services and to achieve more with less input. This 
implies that in addition to productivity increases, the efficiency in the use 
of energy, basic materials, capital, and other inputs will improve, alleviating 
many adverse impacts and improving environmental compatibility. Efficient 
use of time is another important factor, especially in the context of the long- 
term development of transport systems. Great leaps in the advancement of 
transport systems have allowed ever greater distances to be covered in a unit 
of time, from the traditional villages and preindustrial cities connected by 
walking, to almost the whole world being connected in one day by aircraft. 
Technological improvements are achieved both through the introduction 
of fundamentally new solutions (basic innovations), and through incremental 
improvements in existing techniques and systems (product and process inno- 
vations). Although an overlap exists, i t  is important to distinguish between 
the two because it is the basic innovations as originally formulated by Schum- 
peter that will lead to the creation of entirely new industries and growth 
sectors. Innovations provide for economic growth only by their widespread 
application throughout the economy, i.e., via their diffusion. 
During the diffusion process, there is a gradual transition from basic in- 
novations that initially leads to the creation of new industries, to incremen- 
tal improvements, and product innovations as the diffusion process matures. 
During the early development phases the new industry is fluid with a high de- 
gree of diversity and experimentation. The major emphasis is on improving 
technical performance without much regard for price. In the Schumpete- 
rian sense there are often monopoly opportunities arising for the innovative 
entrepreneur. 
vii 
viii 
As competition begins, ane particular technological variant becomes 
dominant and standardization emerges in the new industry. This is usu- 
ally a disruptive phase of development with a characteristic "shake-out": 
only a few competitors survive this phase as prices decrease with the in- 
creasing cost reductions resulting from standardization and learning curve 
effects. Emphasis then shifts to incremental improvements and small cumu- 
lative innovations. Economies of scale and further reductions of costs along 
the learning curve lead to advantages for only a few competitors who can 
internalize the benefits and realize higher profits. Successful basic innova- 
tions diffuse in many sectors, from manufacturing, to transport services, and 
end use or consumption. Computers, internal combustion motors, and jet 
engines (gas turbines) are good examples. 
Eventually the diffusion of pervasive systems can fundamentally change 
many commercial activities and even everyday life. Nonetheless, as the 
technology and its applications mature, the awareness of many disbenefits 
can begin. Cumulative and incremental improvements cover an increasingly 
smaller domain of technical and managerial possibilities. Saturation starts 
and the problems associated with widespread and large scale applications 
become important. The social and institutional response is rather nonlinear 
and disruptive. The awareness of social disbenefits and risks often increase 
rapidly making further diffusion unacceptable. 
During these periods new techno-economic paradigms emerge, and the 
old development trajectory associated with the previous generation of per- 
vasive technologies and institutional forms is not only challenged, but in 
time also replaced with new solutions. This illustrates that there are strong 
links between social development, economic growth, innovation processes, 
and the subsequent diffusion of new technologies. Technological change, or 
the lack of it, is thus a fundamental force in shaping the pattern of social 
and economic development. As regards the former, it is both disruptive 
during the transition period (marked by fluctuations, frictions, and some- 
times crises) and is a source of order for the direction of change and the 
dynamic adjustment processes, as new technologies diffuse through national 
and international economies. 
Some of the most important changes in socio-institutional frameworks 
and economic structure are indeed related to the pervasive adoption of new 
systems. For example, the diffusion of motor vehicles was contingent on the 
development of numerous other systems, such as paved roads, the internal 
combustion engine, oil refining and motor fuels, new sheet metals and high 
quality steels, electrical equipment, and a whole host of other new technolo- 
gies, products, and institutions. 
In this report we use the following approach to outline the likely future 
development of transport systems and their energy requirements. We first 
analyze the development of pervasive transport systems in the past, starting 
with canals, railroads and horse-driven road vehicles, through to automobiles 
and air transport. One of the results of this analysis is that these transport 
systems and their infrastructures evolved according to the technological evo- 
lutionary scheme we have described; an early development phase marked by 
a high degree of experimentation, followed by a rapid growth phase charac- 
terized by standardization and finally the saturation phase when the tech- 
nical and economic potentials appear to be exhausted, leading to structural 
change and transition to the next generation of transport systems. This 
replacement process proceeds according to a schedule that apparently de- 
fines the opportunity windows for the development of particular systems. In 
the leading countries, subsequent diffusion leads to a long, sustained period 
of development with all the diffusion characteristics of pervasive systems. 
In other countries the diffusion is either blocked or occurs later. Our find- 
ings show that in these cases the diffusion process can be faster and can 
be completed at the same time as in the leading countries. However, the 
development time is shorter and the extent of the diffusion is much lower. 
Consequently, railroad networks are smaller in countries where they are in- 
troduced later; similarly, automobile ownership is also lower compared with 
the leading countries. Thus, by the time saturation sets-in the diffusion level 
is lower in those countries where the innovation was introduced later. 
This is basically the nature of our scenario for the further diffusion of 
automobiles and air transport. Automobile ownership and car fleets appear 
to be rather close to saturation in most countries. Until complete satura- 
tion, the global automobile fleet is expected to grow by another 20 to 40 
percent. We find an analogous situation with the further development of air 
transport. The volume of all operations is expected to grow by another 60 
to 80 percent. Both development trajectories will be completed during the 
next 20 to 30 years. Furthermore, we expect this process to  lead to frictions 
and misadjustments, so that the saturation phase will most likely be char- 
acterized by oscillations. This is the reason for the rather wide range in the 
still expected expansion of these two transportation modes. To evaluate the 
actual energy requirements associated with the projected future automobile 
fleet and volume of air transport, we have made two scenarios; both assume 
efficiency improvements in the future. One is based on long-term historical 
efficiency improvements of about one percent per year, and the second on 
more vigorous improvements of about 2.5 percent per year. Based on these 
scenarios, transportation fuel demands will at  best stagnate during the next 
two to three decades. 
This projection, however, does not indicate permanent stagnation of fuel 
demand, but rather a transition period from the saturation of current trans- 
port technologies to  the introduction of a new generation of more productive 
transport systems. Thereafter, energy demand could be expected to increase 
again with further increases in mobility, exchange of tangible goods, and ad- 
vancement of transport systems in general. There are already a number 
of candidate technologies that might lead to the development of pervasive 
transport systems in the next century. Maglevs and hypersonic aircraft are 
two possible candidates. This, however, would represent a revolutionary 
change. In the meantime, incremental and cumulative innovations will make 
the future derivatives of current automobiles and aircraft much more efficient 
and more productive. However, our analysis indicates eventual saturation 
as the technical and economic potentials of these systems slowly become 
exhausted to make way for entirely new forms of travel and goods transport. 
Depending on whether and how our societies adopt these systems, we 
may witness new diffusion clusters in the future, which would have funda- 
mental impacts both on employment and competitiveness, the structure of 
the economy, and consequently also on the patterns of energy use. Since 
their adoption and mediation by society will not be homogeneous and will 
affect countries and regions differentially, the process can be expected to be 
disruptive. 
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Evolution of Transport 
Systems: Past and Future 
uAdd as many mail-coaches as you please, 
you will never get a milroad by so doing." 
Joseph A. Schumpeter (1935) 
1. Introduction 
The history of transport systems is a history of revolutions. Processes of 
technological mutation from the mail-coach to the airplane have transformed 
and extended the spatio-temporal range of commercial and private activities, 
leading to unprecedented levels of performance in terms of speed, quality of 
service, spatial division of activities, and integration of economic spaces. 
In this report we provide a quantitative history of the transport system. 
Intriguing evidence of long-term regularities in the evolution, diffusion, and 
replacement of several families of technologies that constitute our transport 
system emerges, thus facilitating a prospective look into the future. 
The evolutionary envelopes analyzed reveal a process of gradual replace- 
ment of old by new systems along structured, ordered, development trajecto- 
ries that can be formalized mathematically by simple, biological growth and 
interspecies interaction models. Older systems are made obsolete through 
technological advance and economic development, and new ones are intro- 
duced that are better adapted to continuously changing social, economic, 
and environmental boundary conditions. Above all i t  is the advancement 
of technology that has denied or forestalled the original Malthusian resource 
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depletion myth. Mankind has been able to modify and increase the size of 
its niche (including its spatial range) and to sustain a growing population at 
higher levels of economic well-being. 
New transport technologies have been vital for economic development 
since the onset of the Industrial Revolution. In fact they have been so vital 
that economic historians have termed whole periods of economic develop- 
ment after various transport infrastructures, e.g., the "age of canals" in the 
first half of the 19th century, or the "railway era", the expansion of which 
ended with the Great Depression in the 1930s. The oil and automobile 
alliance was the symbol, and one of the main contributing factors, to an ex- 
pansion period unprecedented in the economic history of mankind, but this 
ultimately will .also come to an end. The turbulence and volatility witnessed 
since the early 1970s may be an indicator of a deeper structural transforma- 
tion in the economy as a whole, and of the transport and energy sectors in 
particular. 
Thus, the growth of individual transport systems is not a continuous 
process and is, in addition, time dependent. Based on historical analysis, we 
conclude that there was a time to build canals and railways, as there is a 
time to build highways and to have increasing car ownership rates. However, 
despite the fact that the development of individual transport systems may 
be extremely successful over periods of several decades, any boom period will 
ultimately be followed by a structural discontinuity, a season of saturations, 
in which the expansion of a particular technological system reaches its lim- 
its, in terms of market saturation, social acceptability, and environmental 
constraints. 
We suggest, again based on historical analogy, that it may be more cre- 
ative to think about the opportunities generated by the transition to  a new 
technological regime, rather than to  develop scenarios assuming further de- 
velopment along the trajectories and intensity levels of the previous, by now 
saturating and ultimately vanishing, modes of economic and infrastructural 
development. Based on this working hypothesis we sketch out a scenario 
for the future evolution of the transport sector and consequences for energy 
demand, in particular for oil. The scenario postulates the forthcoming satu- 
ration of automobile diffusion in industrialized countries with no comparable 
(in terms of intensity levels) development in the developing countries. At the 
same time, we consider the possibility of further growth in air transporta- 
tion, as well as the emergence of new high-speed and productivity transport 
modes, such as super- or hypersonic aircraft fueled by methane or hydrogen, 
or maglevs (magnetic levitation trains) based on superconductivity. 
The report begins by giving a long-term account of the evolution of 
transport infrastructures and of the changing structure of the system using 
physical (length) as well as financial (capital stock) measures for a number 
of countries. We then proceed to demonstrate that the evolutionary enve- 
lope that emerges is consistent with the evolution of the intensity of use 
(i.e., passenger- and ton-km transported) of different infrastructures both 
for passenger and goods transportation, including a short discussion of the 
main driving forces behind the historical development pattern. 
We continue with a more detailed analysis of the growth of railway sys- 
tems in different countries, a process completed in all industrialized countries 
by the 1930s. We analyze ez post the very divergent densities in different 
countries in the development of this particular transport system. This then 
serves as an illustrative case to investigate whether a similar observation can 
be made in the diffusion of the automobile (and as we will see it can), and 
to derive a global scenario for automobile diffusion. 
Based on our conclusions with respect to the future evolution of the 
structure of the transport system and our scenario of forthcoming global sat- 
uration in automobile diffusion, we then discuss the long-term winner in the 
competitive game of medium- and long-range transport systems: air trans- 
portation. Using currently available technology, however, even air transport 
with jet-engine propulsion is not capable of meshing the world's major grav- 
ity centers into a functional entity. As a next logical, long-term technologi- 
cal development, we therefore consider the emergence of aircraft with super- 
or even hypersonic flight regimes. Finally based on a historical example, 
we illustrate the likely market response once such advanced long-distance 
transport becomes available. 
Following the scenario on the future of the world's transport system, we 
conclude the report with a short discussion on the possible consequences for 
energy demand in general, and particularly for various oil products, under 
two different sets of assumptions: (1) a continuation of historical trends in 
the evolution of energy efficiency in the transport sector, and (2) a vigorous 
improvement in efficiency. As a comparison, the resulting energy demand 
based on current efficiency levels is also presented. 
2. Evolution of Transport Infrastructures 
One clear trend emerges from historical analysis - transport systems have 
become ever faster, more productive and, at the same time, were greatly 
expanded. The first major improvement occurred with the age of canals. 
Canals represented a fundamental construction effort toward reducing nat- 
ural barriers in order t o  connect coastal and inland waterways in an inter- 
connected transportation infrastructure grid. At the same time, canals were 
the first powerful motor of the industrial age. Waterways facilitated new 
fiows of goods, unprecedented exchanges between regions, specialization of 
labor, and access to  more distant energy and raw material resources. Local 
fuelwood shortages were resolved by substituting with coal, a higher energy- 
density fuel, the transport of which was made possible by canals. The age of 
canals started about two centuries ago and lasted almost one hundred years. 
By the end of the 19th century most national canal systems were in place 
acd many links were already decommissioned. Eventually the canals had to  
yield t o  the vicious competition from railroads, including hostile takeovers. 
The first railways were constructed in the 1830s and they were able t o  
extend the range, speed, and productivity levels previously achieved with 
canals. In time, North America and Europe were covered with elaborate 
networks of railway systems. Together with railways, a new era of coal, 
steam, steel, and the telegraph began. The great railway era lasted until 
the 1930s. Despite some further construction of railway lines in developing 
countries, the global railway network has (because of the decommissioning of 
lines in industrialized countries) remained constant, a t  a level of 1.3 million 
km, ever since the 1930s. Railways have consequently lost their dominant 
position (around 80 to 90 percent of all passenger- and ton-km transported 
in the 1920s and 1930s) in the transport sector throughout the world. 
Around the turn of the century the automobile was born and became 
the symbol of modern industrial development along with oil, petrochemi- 
cals, electricity, the telephone, and (Fordist) manufacturing. Following the 
development of road infrastructure, the automobile again facilitated an in- 
crease in the speed and performance of the transport system.[l] The flexi- 
bility of an individual mode of transportation became affordable for a wider 
social strata, and it was not until about two or three decades ago that the 
disadvantages of the automobile became socially transparent. 
The last in the sequence of infrastructure developments is air transporta- 
tion. Once more, i t  also promoted an increase in the productivity level of 
the transport system in terms of speed, range, and comfort. However, its 
associated infrastructure is "dematerialized" to  right-of-way air corridors, 
with only control and communication and the connecting nodes to  other 
transport modes (airports and hubs) relying on physical structures. 
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Figure 1. Length of canals, railroads, surfaced roads, and federal airways 
in the USA, in 1,000 miles. Source: NakiCenoviC (1988); Griibler (1990). 
Figure I illustrates the development of the four major transport systems 
for the USA, represented by the growth in length of their respective infra- 
structures. The length of all four increased by more than four orders of 
magnitude over the last two centuries. Each successive mode of transport 
expanded into an infrastructure ten times larger than the previous one. It is 
also interesting to note that new infrastructures overtook existing ones only 
when the latter started saturating, e.g., canals and railways in the 1840s, 
and railways and surfaced roads in the 1920s. 
The first canals were built in the 1780s and reached a total length of 
4,000 miles (6,400 km) by 1870 before saturating and then declining; thus 
the expansion of canals lasted about 90 years. The first railroads were built in 
the 1830s and saturation started in the 1920s; again about 90 years later. By 
1929 the total length of railroads was more than 300,000 miles (480,000 km). 
Thus, railways saturated at almost ten times the level of canals. Since then 
rail infrastructure has undergone a phase of rationalization, and railways 
have experienced losses in market shares and volume, both for freight and 
passenger transport. In fact, railways have virtually disappeared from the US 
market in intercity passenger travel, and consequently the size of the railway 
network in the USA has decreased by about one-third, to some 200,000 miles 
(320,000 km). 
The first high quality roads of significant length were introduced a cen- 
tury ago. Today, surfaced roads are approaching saturation with about 3.4 
million miles (5.5 million km) in the USA, again larger by more than a fac- 
tor of ten than the maximum length of railways. Each successive transport 
infrastructure was thus not only an order of magnitude larger than the one 
it replaced, but it also provided a service that was almost ten times faster. 
Figure 2 shows the expansion of the three physical infrastructures in 
the USA, normalized with respect to  their respective saturation levels (by 
plotting the relative length as a percentage of the saturation level). The suc- 
cession of individual infrastructure development can be described in terms 
of three S-shaped growth pulses that are given together with the estimated 
logistic curves. The development of canals, relative to the achieved satu- 
ration level, was much quicker than the expansion of railways and roads. 
The time constant of growth, At,  is about 30 years for canals, 55 years for 
railroads, and 64 years for surfaced roads.[2] The midpoint of the individual 
infrastructure growth pulses (i.e., the time period of their maximum growth 
rate) are spaced at 55-year intervals, as are their periods of saturation of 
expansion. 
It is remarkable that the saturation and onset of decline of all three 
infrastructures coincides with the beginning of prolonged economic reces- 
sions (i.e., in the 1870s, 1930s, and 1980s). At the same time these periods 
of structural discontinuity see the emergence of new transport systems: sur- 
faced roads around 1870 and air transport in the 1930s. If we agree with 
Plutarch that history repeat itself, then one could expect the emergence of a 
new transport infrastructure (maglevs?) around the turn of the millennium. 
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Figure  2. Growth to limits of canals, railroads, and roads in the USA. 
Source: Adapted from NakiCenovit (1988). 
In periods of structural discontinuity, where old mature systems saturate 
and new ones are born, "gales of creative destructionn (Schumpeter, 1942) 
prevail, to give a powerful image of the innovation triggering effects of reces- 
sions/depressions. The successive dichotomy of "boomn periods of economic 
growth, followed by recessionary, even depression periods is known as "long 
waves" in economic development.[3] 
The life cycles between birth, growth, and saturation and the start of 
senescence (decline) of infrastructures are indeed very long, often spanning 
periods in the order of a century. The duration of senescence can be even 
longer. The most vital of the structures, however, are here to  stay. Their im- 
mortality is marked by providing different services than originally envisaged. 
More than a century after the canal age, the remaining inland waterways 
are used for leisure activities, transport of low-value goods, and irrigation. 
There are also more sails today than in the heyday of ocean clippers, but 
they have entered a different market niche serving as pleasure boats and do 
not carry any commercial goods. 
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Figure 3. Growth in length of all transport infrastructures in the USA, in 
fractional share of ultimate saturation level (4.7 million miles or 7.6 million 
km), logit transformation. Source: Griibler (1990). 
Despite the complex picture that emerges when analyzing the evolution 
of individual infrastructures which overlap in their growth, saturation, and 
decline phases, it is interesting to note that the length of the total transport 
infrastructure again proceeds along an ordered evolutionary growth envelope, 
as shown in Figure 3. 
Here we analyze the growth in the length of all transport infrastructures 
by using an S-shaped growth model, in our case a logit model with a 3- 
parameter logistic function.[4] In this and in the following figures we present 
a linear transformation of the S-shaped growth or substitution process in the 
form of f/(l - f )  on a logarithmic scale, where f is the fractional growth 
(market share) achieved at  any particular point in time. The ratio of growth 
(market share) achieved over the growth (market share) remaining to  be 
achieved, when plotted on a logarithmic scale, reveals the logistic growth or 
substitution process as a secular linear trend with small annual perturba- 
tions. 
Figure 3 presents an expanding niche in which individual transport infra- 
structures rival for relative positions with respect to  their share in the length 
of all infrastructures (and as we will see below also in terms of their market 
shares in passenger- and ton-km transported). Figure 3 portrays a remark- 
able homeostatic behavior in the evolution of transport infrastructures in the 
USA, in that the saturation and later decline of individual infrastructures 
(canals first and later also railways) has up to the present been "filledn by 
the growth of newer infrastructures consistent with the logistic envelope of 
Figure 3 .  This feature is frequently observed in the evolution of dynamic, 
self-organizing systems in chemistry or biology. The growth of this envelope 
proceeds with a At of 80 years, i.e., slower than the growth of any individual 
infrastructure (ranging from a At of 30 years for canals t o  64 years for the 
surfaced road network). Should this process continue to unfold as it has in 
the past, saturation would occur around 2030 at a level of around 7.6 mil- 
lion km, i.e., with a value around 25 percent higher than a t  present. (We 
estimate a 90 percent probability that the saturation level will be between 
6.6 and 8.3 million km.) 
Within an expanding niche individual transport infrastructures compete 
for their relative importance (measured by their respective share in the 
total infrastructure network) by replacing previously dominant transport 
infrastructures. Figure 4 presents the structural evolution of the transport 
infrastructure in the USA, organized with the help of a multivariate logis- 
tic substitution model.[5] This particular representation shows the relative 
importance of competing infrastructures and the dynamics of the structural 
evolution process over the last 160 years. In any given period, there is a 
clear market dominance (i.e., more than a 50 percent share) and at the same 
time a simultaneous spread of transport activities over two or three different 
systems. Thus, while competing infrastructures are all simultaneously used, 
their mix changes over. time. 
Another observation from Figure 4 is that  the phasing out of transport 
infrastructures apparently takes increasingly longer time constants. While 
the decline in the relative importance of canals proceeded with a At of 45 
years, that  of the railways already required a At of 80 years. The decline 
in the relative importance of road infrastructure is expected to  be an even 
longer process with an estimated At of 130 years. As a result, the maxima 
in the share of total infrastructure length between railways and surfaced 
roads is about 100 years, indicating the considerable time span involved 
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Figure 4. Substitution of transport infrastructures in the USA, shares in 
length, logit transformation. Source: NakiCenovit (1988). 
in the transition from the dominance of one infrastructure system to the 
next. Based on this assumption one could expect the period of maximum 
dominance for airways not to occur before the year 2050. This immediately 
raises the question of what could be the next dominant infrastructure system 
evolving after the year 2050; high-speed maglevs, supersonic aircraft, or some 
other competing new system? 
The difference in the dynamics (Ats) of the growth of individual infra- 
structures and their relative shares in total infrastructure length may ap- 
pear at first sight as a contradiction. However, this difference is the result 
of the complex coupled dynamics of total infrastructure growth, and the 
growth and decline rates of individual transport infrastructures. As the to- 
tal length of infrastructures increases, even the rapid growth of individual 
infrastructures, such as airways, will translate only into slower growth rates 
in their relative shares. Once the growth rates of an individual transport 
infrastructure fall behind the growth of the total system, their relative share 
starts to decline. In the case of railways the share in total infrastructure 
length began to decrease in 1870, whereas the railway network continued t o  
expand until the end of the 1920s. Similarly, the length of the surfaced road 
network still continues t o  increase (despite being close t o  apparent satura- 
tion at relatively low rates) although its relative share started t o  decrease in 
the 1960s. 
Thus, the total length of an individual infrastructure can still be growing, 
and even be decades away from ultimate saturation and subsequent senes- 
cence in absolute network size, but its share in the total length of the whole 
transport system has already begun to decline. The saturation and decline 
in relative market shares precedes saturation in absolute growth in a growing 
market (an expanding niche). This implies that the eventual saturation of 
any competing technology may be anticipated by the substitution dynamics 
in a growing market, such as for railways as early as 1870 and for roads as 
of 1960. The infrastructure substitution model presented in Figure 4 ,  may, 
therefore, be considered as an precursor indicator model, for the long-term 
evolution and fate of individual infrastructures. 
We conclude this discussion on the long-term evolution of transport infra- 
structures in the USA by pointing out the regularity in the rise and fall of the 
importance of individual transport infrastructures. This regularity appears 
consistent even during very disruptive events like the depression of the 1930s 
or the effects of major wars. We conjecture that this stable behavior may 
be the result of an invariant pattern in societal preferences with respect t o  
individual transport infrastructures, resulting from differences in the perfor- 
mance levels (seen as a complex vector rather than represented by a single 
measure) inherent t o  different transport infrastructures and technologies. 
Figure 5 reports an analysis of the changing structure of transport infra- 
structures in Canada, using a .  an alternative measure the embodied capital 
stock.[6] The basic pattern of the sequence of replacements identified for 
the USA is confirmed by this analysis, although the relative importance of 
air infrastructure in the capital stock is, due to  its "immaterialn nature, 
smaller than when considering its respective length or share in output of 
the transport sector. It is even more important to  realize the very long 
time constants involved in the structural transition in the composition of 
the transport sector capital stock: the Ats for the decline of railways and 
growth of road infrastructure are in the order of 80 years, and the decline 
of canals and growth of air infrastructure even slower with Ats of nearly 
200 years. Transport structures are built to  last, they are almost immortal. 
Once their original use declines because of changing societal preferences and 
requirements, new applications may evolve, e.g., the Rideau Canal in Canada 
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Figure 5. Share of canals, railways, roads, and air transport infrastructures 
in the quasi capital stock of the transport system in Canada, logit transfor- 
mation. 
has been converted into a leisure center and the former Gare d'Orsay in Paris, 
an impressive monument of the railway era, was converted into a museum 
and opened in the late 1980s. 
Figure 6 reports the substitution of transport infrastructures in the So- 
viet Union and Tzarist Russia before the revolution. The pattern of temporal 
changes is marked by a high degree of regularity and quest for higher speed 
and productivity. The dynamics of the substitution process are character- 
ized by similar time constants. The range of Ats is all in the vicinity of 
100 years. Despite the similarity in the structural evolution between the 
USA and USSR, one should note that the timing of the phase transitions 
are lagged by a few decades, as illustrated in F i g u ~  7. The decline of canals 
occurred much later and at a much slower pace in the USSR due to  an ex- 
tensive canal construction program after the October Revolution.[7] As a 
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Figure 6. Substitution of transport infrastructures in the USSR, shares in 
length, logit transformation. Source: Griibler (1990). 
function of planning, canals have enjoyed a period of revival over the last 
decades, hovering around the two percent market share. 
During the last decades, the development of the transport infrastructure 
in the two countries has been converging. For example, the dominance of 
railways in the USSR lasted until the 1940s while in the USA it  ended 
two decades earlier. The speed of phase out, however, is strikingly similar. 
Also the speed of growth in the importance of road infrastructure and its 
apparent saturation appears to  be synchronized between the two countries. 
The growth of national airways in the USSR follows a similar path to  that of 
the USA, and appears even to proceed somewhat faster. For the year 2000 
and thereafter we may summarize the situation in both countries as follows: 
canals will be almost extinct (in terms of relative importance), and railways 
will account for only a few percent of the infrastructure length. The most 
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Figure 7. Infrastructure substitution in the USA and the USSR, shares in 
length, logit transformation. 
important transport infrastructures in both countries will be roads with a 
decreasing share and airways with an increasing share. 
tVe maintain, therefore, that the similar structural and functional evolu- 
tion in the transport infrastructures of the two countries has deeper causality 
roots. These can be seen in the differences in performance levels of individ- 
ual infrastructures, in particular transport speed and basic human decision 
criteria due to private and commercial user preference for more time-efficient 
and faster transport modes. To a large extent the similarity is due to the 
fact that both countries have relatively low population densities and vast 
territories that modern transport systems must bridge in a matter of hours. 
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3. Use of Transport Infrastructures 
(Modal Split) 
In the previous examples we discussed the structural change in the transport 
infrastructure using the length of different infrastructures as a crude mea- 
sure. Another way to assess the importance of individual transport systems 
is to consider their performance in terms of their share in the total output of 
the transport system, measured in passenger- and ton-km transported. Us- 
ing this measure, the intensity of use for different transport infrastructures 
is more clearly reflected. 
3.1 Passenger transport 
In the following examples we will analyze the evolution of the long-distance 
passenger modal split, i.e., passenger-km transported by different transport 
modes. Long-distance passenger transport is a good indicator in that it 
constitutes the transport niche in which there is a higher premium for speed 
and quality of service. As such it also gives an anticipative picture of what 
could occur in lower-value market segments, such as goods transport. 
Figure 8 presents the evolution of the domestic intercity passenger traffic 
in billion passenger-miles for the USA. The decline in the transport output 
of railways,[8] the stagnation of bus transport, the continuing growth in 
car transport, and finally the rapid, exponential growth of passenger air 
transport, characterize the situation of this premium market. The model 
forecasts presented in Figure 8 are derived from the relative market share 
estimates of different transport modes (Figure 9) applied to (exponential 
growth) estimates of total market volume. Total intercity passenger traffic 
increased in the USA from 506 billion passenger-miles in 1950 to close to 
1,820 billion passenger-miles in 1986, i.e., at an average annual growth rate 
of 3.6 percent. Despite the simplicity of our model, the fit to  nearly 40 years 
of empirical data is noteworthy. If we extend the model projections into the 
future, air transport would reach parity in intercity passenger traffic with 
automobile transportation around the year 2010. 
The positive or negative trends in the relative market shares of different 
intercity transport modes in the USA since 1950 underlie our estimate of in- 
tercity transport volume by mode. Figure 9 shows a regular competitive pat- 
tern in the market shares of four different transport modes for long-distance 
passenger travel: private cars, public buses, railways, and aircraft.[9] The 
Figure 8. Volume of intercity passenger traffic by transport mode in the 
USA, in 10' passenger-miles (logarithmic scale). Source: Adapted from 
NakiLenoviL (1988). 
analysis shows railways at the end of their technological life cycle for long- 
distance passenger transport in the USA. Since about 1970 railways trans- 
port less than one percent of the total passenger-miles of intercity traffic. The 
situation in the USA precedes similar tendencies in other countries by sev- 
eral decades. Bus transport appears to  closely follow the long-term decline 
trend and, based on the model forecast, should fall below the one percent 
market share level by the mid-1990s. 
The share of private cars reached its maximum market share in the early 
1960s, when close to 90 percent of all intercity passenger-miles were per- 
formed by automobiles. It is perhaps ironic, but not incidental, that at the 
moment their decline in relative market shares began, due to growing air 
traffic, cars exhibited the secondary design characteristics of aircraft. This 
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Figure 9. Modal split in intercity passenger traffic in the USA, in fractional 
share of passenger-miles performed, logit transformation. Source: Updated 
(US DOC, 1987) from NakiCenoviC (1986). 
is illustrated by such models as the 1951 Buick LeSabre or the 1959 Cadil- 
lac Cyclone; perhaps a formalistic mimicry of the forthcoming competitive 
"drama." 
The share of air transport in total long-distance passenger travel in- 
creases with a At of around 70 years (symmetrical to  the decrease in the 
market shares of cars). Air travel presently accounts for around 18 percent 
of intercity traffic and, if the long-term growth tendency should continue, 
will become the preferred mode of long-distance passenger travel in the USA 
after the year 2010. 
The principal driving force behind this structural change in the preferred 
mode of long-distance travel appears primarily related to the differences in 
performance levels of individual transport modes, particularly travel speed, 
and not so much to the relative transport cost structure. Since 1950 to the 
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Figure 10. Modal split in intercity passenger traffic in the USSR, in frac- 
tional share of passenger-km performed. Source: Griibler (1990). 
present, the average operating costs, including fuel, for private cars ranged 
between 10 and 13 US cents (base year 1967) per mile. Assuming on aver- 
age two passengers per long-distance car travel, this results in an average 
cost of between 5 and 7 cents (1967) per passenger-mile. Air transport only 
reached such low costs by the mid-1970s, significantly after the market share 
of cars started to decline. Further, during the whole period under consider- 
ation, railway transport costs were consistently significantly lower, at below 
4 cents (1967) per passenger-mile. We conclude, therefore, that i t  is not 
primarily economic variables that appear to influence long-distance modal 
split decisions. 
The analysis of the long-term evolution of the modal split in intercity pas- 
senger traffic for the USSR is reported in Figure 10. Despite some structural 
differences a similar dynamic development pattern to that of the USA can be 
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Figure 11. Intercity passenger-km by mode in the USSR, in 10' passenger- 
km and model estimates. 
seen. Traditional, slow transport modes lose out logistically to new competi- 
tors such as road and air transport. Note,however, that road transport is not 
by private cars but by public buses instead. Inland water passenger trans- 
port has virtually disappeared as a long-distance transport mode, railways 
have been declining since the 1930s, and road transport is currently entering 
saturation and may become replaced in the long term by air transport. 
Based on the relative market share model estimates and a scenario of 
total intercity passenger-km demand growth[lO] Figure 11 shows model es- 
timates of the passenger-km performance of different transport modes in the 
USSR, together with historical data. 
To illustrate the differences as well as the convergence in the two coun- 
tries, Figure 12 compares the historical development in the two countries 
in the logit transform. Whereas inland navigation for long-distance passen- 
ger transport in the USSR disappeared only in the mid-1970s, showing a 
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Figure 12. Modal split in intercity passenger traffic in the USA and the 
USSR, in fractional share of passenger-km performed, logit transformation. 
similar dynamics in its displacement as public bus transport in the USA, 
a distinct difference exists in the relative role of rail transport in the two 
countries. Railways still presently account for some 37 percent of all inter- 
city passenger-km in the USSR, whereas in the USA they have fallen below 
the one percent market share. Be that as i t  may, their displacement process, 
while lagged by some 50 years (to 1972 compared to 1921 in case of the USA) 
appears to proceed at a similar rate ( A t  of 55 years compared to 48 years in 
the USA). Saturation in the market share of road transport (buses) in the 
USSR appears to occur somewhere in the 1990s, i.e., some 30 years after the 
saturation of the market share of cars in the USA. 
The most striking similarity, however, occurs in the area of air transport. 
Air transport in the USSR presently accounts for some 18.5 percent of all 
intercity passenger-km, compared to 17.6 percent in the case of the USA. 
The dynamics of market share gains of air transport in both countries is very 
close: to is estimated to occur in 2006 in the USSR with a At of 77 years, 
and in the USA in 2008 with a At of some 70 years. 
As reflected by their similar rates of change, this points to the very sim- 
ilar structure in the comparative advantages of the transport modes in the 
long-distance passenger modal split between the two countries. This is con- 
sistent whether one considers the negative comparative advantage, such as 
the decline in importance of railways, or the positive comparative advantage, 
as in the case of growing air transport. This similarity in the dynamics of 
structural change in the modal split is important especially considering the 
differences between a market and centrally planned economy, and addition- 
ally with respect to  the transport policies pursued in the two countries: pro- 
motion and further railway construction in the USSR compared to decreasing 
network size and disappearance in the USA; road transport by public buses 
as opposed to private car ownership; monopoly of the largest airline com- 
pany in the world AEROFLOT versus vicious competition between private 
airlines in the USA, etc. 
We believe, therefore, that the inherent advantages of air transport in 
altering the human space-time activity framework, i.e., the increased travel 
range resulting from higher technological performance, in particular speed, 
is responsible for the market share gains of air transport in intercity passen- 
ger transport. As shown above for the USSR and the USA, this comparative 
advantage, resulting from fundamental human time allocation mechanisms, 
influences the individual time budgets and consequent long-distance trans- 
port mode preferences of people, regardless of economic differences. 
A hierarchy of space and time territories emerges. As has been convinc- 
ingly demonstrated in the work of Zahavi (1979 and 1981) and confirmed by 
the international time allocation survey coordinated by Szalai (1972), the 
average time devoted to  traveling by an individual appears to  be close to  
an anthropological constant: it ranges from 1 to 1.5 hours per day, both in 
rural-agricultural and in urban-industrial societies. A man walking or using 
waterways could cover a mean circle of a few kilometers diameter in one 
hour - the size of a village and its hinterland, or of imperial Rome at the 
time of Emperor Augustus. A person traveling by rail or horse could travel 
more than a dozen kilometers in the same period a hundred years ago. The 
automobile and rapid rail systems offer a larger range of up to 100 km, and 
can effectively connect cities, while air travel extends the radius t o  almost 
1,000 km. As connected territory increases, so does travel, tangible goods 
transport, and information flow per unit of time. This explains the basi- 
cally exponential growth path in the output of the transport system both 
for passengers and goods since the onset ol the Industrial Revolution. 
Consequently, beyond the year 2000 we foresee a similar structure for 
both countries: railways will have disappeared (in the USA) or account 
for only a few percent of passenger-km traveled (USSR); private (USA) or 
collective (USSR) road and air transport will become the dominant long- 
distance transport modes with approximately equal shares. If unchallenged 
by the appearance of a fundamentally new, high-speed, long-distance trans- 
port mode, the importance of air transport is expected to increase further 
at the expense of road transport. Huwever, in view of the long lead times 
required for the introduction and growth of new transport technologies, it 
appears very unlikely that significant market impacts of such a system could 
be expected before the first decades of the next millennium. 
The dynamics of the intercity passenger modal split in the USA and 
USSR analyzed above covered the periods from 1950 and 1920, respectively. 
We now extend our analysis even further back by analyzing the case of 
France since the beginning of the 19th century (Figure 13). Although there 
remain some inherent weaknesses in the data base we were able to trace 
in historical archives, e.g., it was not possible to distinguish between local 
(short-distance) and long-distance (intercity) passenger traffic, the picture 
emerging reveals interesting insights both in its phases of regular structural 
evolution as well as in its distinct nonlinearities and discontinuities as a 
result of external shocks to the system. 
Before the advent of the railways the dominant modes of passenger trans- 
port in France were horse carriages and coaches, and barges on inland water- 
ways. The improved travel speed and comfort offered by railways resulted 
in the displacement in terms of market share of the two previously dominant 
modes of passenger travel, despite efforts at improvement, e.g., the introduc- 
tion of steam power on inland navigation. Inland waterways disappeared as 
a passenger transport mode by the 1850s, and although the market share 
of horse transport declined at a slower rate, it finally disappeared with the 
advent of the automobile around the turn of the century. 
The growth of the market share of road transport depicted in Figure 
13 started around 1880, i.e., significantly before the introduction of large 
numbers of automobiles. This points to another frequent feature in the in- 
troduction of new transport systems: the preparation of the ground by early, 
precursor technologies. In the case of road transport these pre-automobile- 
age technologies were the bicycle and later the motorcycle.[ll] 
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Figure 13. Model split in passenger (intra- and intercity) transport in 
France, in fractional share of passenger-km performed, logit transformation. 
Source: Griibler (1990). 
Once motorcycles and later automobiles appeared in significant num- 
bers to expand the competitive niche opened by the bicycle, road transport 
started to replace railways along a logistic substitution pat tern, proceeding 
with a At of around 60 years. The turbulence in this substitution trajectory 
due to World War I was elastically absorbed and the process proceeds reg- 
ularly up to 1939. Much more dramatic was the effect of World War 11 and 
the occupation by German troops of a large part of France. As Figure 13 
shows, World War I1 represented a major political, social, and technological 
discontinuity in the long-term development pattern of France. In fact, the 
disruption appears (contrary to World War I) so strong as to  result in a 
major structural discontinuity and break in the long-term trend. During the 
war years the historical diffusion pattern of motorized road transport was 
reversed. Much more important, however, is that after the war the prewar 
diffusion level is attained in only about 15 years. As a result of this major 
discontinuity no continuous technological substitution model application is 
possible. 
Another interesting fact also emerges from Figure 13: the diflusion rates 
(i.e., the slope of the substitution trajectories) did not change due to this 
discontinuity. Thus, after some 15 years the system reassumed its previous 
diffusion pattern after reaching the prewar level again. According to diffu- 
sion theory this is an indication that the relative comparative advantages 
(defining the speed of diffusion, i.e., A t )  between different transport modes 
was not affected by the discontinuity. The comparative advantage of road 
transport as represented in its At of around 60 years remained the same in 
both time periods, i.e., between 1900 and 1939 and after World War 11; the 
substitution process is simply shifted by 15 years. 
Railways continued their declining market share trajectory in symmetry 
with the growth of road transport. Since 1970 their decline rate has, how- 
ever, slowed down, indicating that they are apparently phasing out more 
slowly from their last remaining (below ten percent) market share largely 
consisting of commuting and subsidized transport (e.g., for school children, 
military personnel, etc.). After its period of spectacular growth and market 
dominance of more than 80 percent of all passenger-km transported, road 
transport now appears to be saturating due to the growth of newer competi- 
tors such as air transport. The slower growth rates in air travel in France, 
compared to the situation in the USA or the USSR, is a direct consequence 
of the shorter distances traveled and of the resulting smaller comparative 
advantage (in terms of reduced travel time) compared to other transport 
modes. 
In order to illustrate the possible emergence of new transport systems 
and its likely impact on the passenger modal split, we have plotted the 
market share of the TGV (train ri grande vitesse) trains separately in Figure 
13. The expansion and success of the TGV connections in France, in part 
via the construction of its own dedicated infrastructure lines and in part 
using the existing, traditional railway network, has frequently been seen as 
an indication of a railway renaissance in Europe. The TGV provides an 
interesting example of a combination of a new infrastructure network with a 
traditional technological base. In the past, successful new transport systems 
have been characterized by a combination of a new infrastructure and a new 
technological base, like railways with steam powered locomotives or surfaced 
roads with internal combustion engine automobiles. From such a perspective, 
we consider the TGV as a transitional system. Like many early pioneering 
systems, it combines elements of traditional and new infrastructures. As 
such, i t  is functionally more close to the hybrids of the early railway age, 
such as the horse railway between Linz and Budweis (the first railway line 
constructed in 1832 in Europe (excluding the UK), than a model for the 
ultimate high-speed, long-distance transit systems of the next millennium. 
Despite its high visibility and success on certain routes (e.g., Paris-Lyon) 
the market impact of the TGV is still relatively minor with only slightly more 
than one percent of the total passenger-km in France. In the absence of an 
adequate historical data base to calculate a future scenario,-we assume an 
entirely speculative growth trajectory for the TGV in Figure 13 to illustrate 
the impact on the passenger modal split in France. If history is a guide, 
one might expect a continuation of the rapid diffusion up to a level of a few 
percent of the market share and then a transition to a slower substitution tra- 
jectory, consistent with observed historical market penetration rates. Even 
in our speculative high growth scenario, the dominance of the automobile in 
passenger transportation in F'rance would not be affected noticeably before 
the turn of the century. The basic message from our discussion on France 
is that the competitive interaction between different transport technologies 
rivaling for market shares appears to be influenced in the long run only by 
the introduction of new, more productive modes of transportation. 
The appearance of such systems for merging large urban corridors to  sin- 
gle functional entities, along the lines of the Japanese Shinkansen, would be 
timely, especially in conjunction with the possible emergence of new high- 
speed air transportation with supersonic fiight regimes. This could result 
in a new hierarchy of complementary high-speed infrastructures: advanced 
aircraft connecting the largest urban centers of the world in as little as two 
hours. Their hubs would be fed by high-speed maglevs and/or regional 
aircraft, which would also connect urban agglomerations on a regional, e.g., 
European or continental USA, scale. Finally road transportation (not neces- 
sarily based only on private vehicles but, for instance, on new organizational 
forms such as wider use of rented cars) and metros would provide spatial cov- 
erage at the last hierarchical level of the transport chain: final distribution 
in rural areas, agglomerations, and urban centers. 
In France, the increase in the passenger transport volume has proceeded 
at a faster pace than the growth of GNP measured in constant money terms. 
As shown in Figure 14 the passenger transport intensity has grown by over 
a factor of 53 since 1800, i.e., from 0.04 to 2.2 passenger-km per unit of GDP 
(in constant 1913 Francs), which corresponds to an average annual growth 
rate of 2.2 percent. For goods transport intensity this factor is lower: i t  
increased between 1800 and 1985 from 0.2 to 0.8 ton-km per 1913 Francs 
Figure 14. Total passenger- and ton-km per constant GDP in France since 
1800, in passenger- and ton-km per unit of GDP (in constant 1913 Francs). 
Source: Griibler (1990). 
GDP, i.e., by a factor of four or at an average annual growth rate of 0.75 
percent.[l2] Considering that moving people represents the highest value 
premium market segment of the transport sector, the much higher histori- 
cal growth rates of the passenger transport intensity should not come as a 
surprise. 
The passenger and ton-km growth in relation to GDP growth discussed 
above may also be analyzed in terms of the commonly used indicator of elas- 
ticity, i.e., the relationship of transport output growth to economic growth as 
shown in Figure 15. A first observation from Figure 15 is that over most of 
the time period under consideration elasticity is significantly above one. Sec- 
ond, i t  shows typical fluctuations as a result of medium-term business cycles 
(in Figure 15 the very strong annual fluctuations in elasticity are smoothed 
out by a 3-year moving average). It  is noteworthy that up to the 1970s, 
elasticity for passenger and goods transport with respect to GDP growth 
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Figure 15. Total passenger- and ton-km to constant GDP growth elasticity 
in France. Source: Griibler (1990). 
did not bifurcate, i.e., while being different in various historical phases, both 
showed a synchronous behavior and moved in the same positive or negative 
direction.[l3] 
Since the early 1970s however, we observe a complete bifurcation. Goods 
transport growth appears to progressively decouple from economic growth 
as shown by the negative elasticities over an extended period of time. In 
contrast, passenger transport elasticities have been positive. Whereas this 
may be a specific case for France (a similar analysis for the FRG showed no 
strong divergence), it is nevertheless an indicator that in future the transport 
demand for passenger and high-value goods may portray a different behavior 
to that of low-value products. 
At present, i t  is not clear whether the trend observed in France is also rep- 
resentative for other countries, especially from a long-term perspective. Still, 
it appears likely that with increasingly affluent societies passenger transport 
demand will continue to grow in the future. In the goods transport sector, 
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Increasing affluence means an increase in the value and information (soft- 
ware) content, and a decrease in the material and energy input per unit 
value added of the goods produced and consumed. This implies that a fur- 
ther decoupling of ton-km transport volume from economic growth might 
be expected in the longer term. This decoupling of course does not mean 
that the total ton-km transported will decrease, rather that its growth rate 
will fall behind that of GNP growth, as much of the economic growth will 
be based on the service sector with many "immaterial" (i1;formation and 
value-intensive) kinds of products. 
If one of the predominant features of a next step in economic develop- 
ment is the widespread application of new information and communication 
technologies, the question arises of how this would affect passenger traffic. 
It has often been claimed that it is precisely the widespread diffusion of new 
information and communication technologies that could result in a signifi- 
cant reduction of personal travel: that new communication technologies will 
eventually be a substitute for traveling. 
In order to examine the long-term relationship between passenger trans- 
port and communication, we compare the total output of the two systems 
in France over a long period in time. This should allow for an analysis of 
whether the introduction of different new transport and communication sys- 
tems has caused any change in their relationship. Figure 16 reports the evo- 
lution of total passenger-km transported and total output of the communi- 
cation sector (total number of messages sent, i.e., letters, telegrams, telexes, 
telefaxes, and telephone calls) since the beginning of the 19th century. 
The two measures are not directly comparable but are normalized by 
using an index of 100 for their 1985 output levels. Both transport and com- 
munication have increased over four orders of magnitude since the beginning 
of the 19th century. The impact of both world wars, in particular World War 
I1 is dearly visible in Figure 16. Also visible is the fact that from a long- 
term perspective transport and communication have evolved in unison. This 
points to a complementary, synergistic type of relationship rather than to 
substitutability. 
However, transport and communication have not always grown at  exactly 
the same rate initially because of the introduction of railways and later 
automobiles. Passenger transport grew faster than communication over a 
period of several decades; in the long term, however, the two have always 
reestablished parity. This long-term parity rate appears to be in the vicinity 
of around six passenger-km traveled per message transmitted. As shown in 
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Figure 16. Growth of passenger transport and communication in France, 
measured in total passenger-km transported and total number of messages 
transmitted, index 1985=100. Source: Griibler (1990). 
Figure 17, this is not only true for F'rance but also Germany (FRG after 
1945) and the UK. 
The ratio presented in Figure 17 reflects the relative increases in com- 
munication through actual physical travel (i.e., face-to-face communication) 
compared to communication through information channels. From Figure 17 
i t  becomes apparent that this ratio started increasing in 1830, peaked around 
the 1860s (due to the growth of railways) and remained more or less con- 
stant between 1880 and 1920. As a result of the diffusion of the automobile, 
this ratio increased substantially from 1920 until the 1970s, when a trend 
reversal occurred. 
Presently, communication via information channels is increasing more 
rapidly than passenger travel. Advanced electronic systems, as well as the 
emerging photonic technologies, will increase the relative information capac- 
ity of transmission channels by a few orders of magnitude. New communi- 
cation services are rapidly expanding, such as the use of facsimile integrated 
into personal computers or mobile telephones. New and more productive 
messages 
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Figure 17. Ratio of passenger travel to messages sent in France, Germany 
(FRG after 1945), and the UK. Source: Nakikenovid (1989). 
communication technologies may indeed substitute a number of business or 
commuting trips. At the same time, new communication technologies may 
in turn also induce additional travel, e.g., a reduction in travel for business 
and daily errands could lead to more time being devoted to leisure and hol- 
iday trips. This kind of conservation principle of the travel time budget 
counterbalancing business travel reductions owing to new communication 
technologies is observed, for instance, in the case of the FRG (Cerwenka, 
1986). 
From this standpoint, one might conclude that whatever growth potential 
becomes realized, as a result of new communication technologies, it may just 
be sufficient to bring the ratio of face-to-face to information channel com- 
munication back to long-term parity. Thus, while the growth of transport 
and communication was not totally in unison, they do enhance each other 
and show many parallel developments. Consequently, new communication 
technologies may be seen as catch-up instruments in the long-term comple- 
mentary and synergistic relationship between transport and communication, 
a hypothesis at  least consistent with 200 years of history. 
3.2 Goods Transport 
Time is a valuable resource. With the possibility of a constant travel time al- 
location, the demand for faster passenger transport modes (and thus travel 
range) tends to increase (subject to money constraints). We have shown 
above that the long-term structural evolution of the transport infrastructure 
and of the passenger modal split have and continue to  favor faster transport 
modes for passenger travel. The situation with respect t o  the driving forces 
behind the modal split for goods is, t o  some extent, different. Here we 
deal with a nonhomogeneous product mix between bulk, low-value density 
(value per unit weight or volume) to very high-value density products. As 
the value density of a product increases, the more stringent are the require- 
ments imposed on the transport system. Long transport times require larger 
inventories and tie up corresponding working capital. Risk of loss and dam- 
age tends to  increase with exposure time so that more valuable goods are 
transported by faster transport modes and require a higher quality service 
and usually smaller shipment sizes. 
Figure 18 illustrates the development of the modal split for the transport 
of domestic goods in the FRG. The share of waterways and of rail transporta- 
tion is decreasing while that of road transport is increasing. Because of the 
low tonnage transported by air, air transport does not even appear on Figure 
18. Figure 19 reports a similar analysis for Japan with the goods modal 
split portraying similar dynamic tendencies. For both countries, this can 
be modeled quite accurately by a simple multivariate logistic substitution 
model. 
There is another reason why Japan is of interest: of all industrialized 
countries the share of rail transportation is the lowest - only around 5 per- 
cent of all ton-km is transported by rail. This is certainly not coincidental. 
The whole philosophy of inventory minimization and just-in-time produc- 
tion regimes is probably the most advanced in Japan, imposing additional 
stringent criteria on the performance of the goods transport sector. Judged 
by the continuous decline in the market share, railways have so far failed to 
fulfill these stringent requirements. 
Air transport again does not appear on Figure 19, as i t  is still signifi- 
cantly below the one percent level. Using the historical data of air transport 
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Figure 18. Modal split in domestic goods transport in the FRG, in shares 
of transport modes in ton-km transported. Source: Griibler (1990). 
growth (increasing with an estimated At of around 60 years, i.e., the dy- 
namics are similar to the introduction of road transport) we have projected 
a scenario of when advanced high-speed transportation in Japan (either air- 
craft or maglevs) should rise above the one percent level. The resulting 
*phantomp scenario appears well after the turn of the millennium, around 
2017, indicating that road transport will continue to grow and remain the 
dominant mode of goods transport in Japan over the next few decades. 
In Figure 20, in order to obtain a longer-term dynamic picture, we an- 
alyze the evolution in France since 1800. By using the logit transform of 
the fractional shares of different transport modes the various phases in their 
life cycle are more clearly revealed. In the past, typically new transport 
modes for goods have grown along a four-stage, life-cycle model. Once in- 
troduced, their rapid growth quickly displaces existing transport modes, first 
by- carrying higher-value goods, i.e., passengers and information, and later 
high-value density products. This rapid first phase of market share gains 
lasted from 1830 to 1870 in the case of railways, from 1910 to the end of 
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Figure 19. Modal split in domestic goods transport in Japan, in shares of 
various transport modes in ton-km transported and model estimates, logit 
transformation. 
the 1930s for trucks, and from 1955 to 1965 for oil and gas pipelines. The 
size of the respective market shares gained in this first phase was highest 
for railways, with more than 50 percent of all ton-km. Truck transportation 
also rapidly filled its first market niche, but, with around 25 percent market 
share, it was already smaller. The specialized market segment for pipelines 
never exceeded 15 percent of all ton-km transported. 
Once the initial niche has been conquered, growth proceeds at a signif- 
icantly slower pace with additional shares being won from the traditional, 
slower transport modes, primarily via tariff competition. This second phase 
is completed once a system reaches maturity and complete market domi- 
nance. In France, this second phase lasted from about 1870 to the 1920s 
for railways, with over 70 percent of all ton-km in France being shipped by 
rail. For truck transport this second phase still appears to be continuing, as 
shown in the growing market share projections in Figures 18 and 19.  
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Figure 20. Goods modal split in France since 1800, in fractional share of 
ton-km transported, logit transformation. Source: Griibler (1990). 
The third phase of the four-stage, life-cycle model consists of a relatively 
long saturation period during which a transport mode loses market shares 
but maintains a dominant position. For the railways in France, this third 
phase lasted until the 1950s and 1960s, when their respective market share 
fell below the 50 percent barrier for the first time. The last phase is the 
period of fall and decline under vicious competition from newer transport 
modes. This has been the case for railways since the 1950s. Railways are 
progressively retreating into the market niches with the lowest value for the 
goods transport sector by transporting bulk, low-due raw materials, e.g., 
gravel, scrap, or coal, where low transportation costs are a more important 
criteria than quality of service or speed. 
The main driving forces for the changing structure of the goods modal 
split may be summarized as follows: increasing d u e  density of tangible 
goods and decreasing material intensity also tend to generate higher value 
added in the transport sector. Higher quality of service, smaller batch sizes, 
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Figure 21. Ratio of value added over inventories in the manufacturing sec- 
tor of selected countries versus railway share in goods transportation 1960- 
1985. Source: UN, Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, 1977 and 1987; IRF, 
World Road Statistics and National Transport Statistics, 1970 to 1987. 
and faster and reliable deliveries are required for the transportation of high- 
value density goods. Despite higher ton-km tariffs the total transport costs 
incurred are lower, due to quicker turn-around times that allow for a signif- 
- - 
icant reduction in inventories and working capital that would otherwise be 
- - 
tied up in goods waiting to be shipped. 
The quest for inventory minimization and ever higher turnover in the 
manufacturing sector is illustrated in Figure 21 for a number of European 
countries and Japan. As an indicator of the performance of the manufac- 
turing sector we take the ratio between the value added over inventories. A 
value of one, such as the case for Hungary, implies that a whole years' worth 
of value added is tied up in inventories, either at the place of production, 
with wholesale and retail dealers, or in transit. On the other hand, a high 
value of three, as for Japan, indicates that the total value added in manu- 
facturing has an annual turnover of three. In order to  minimize warehousing 
and inventory, and to allow for an increase in the turnover of working capi- 
tal, speedy and reliable delivery is expedient. Thus the performance of the 
transport sector may explain some of the variances in the turnover rate in 
the manufacturing sector of different countries. We use the share of railways 
as an indicator of the transport system speed because railways are generally 
slower than road transport, and because high tonnage railway cars represent 
larger shipment sizes. 
Although the relationship between both variables changes discontinu- 
ously, as indicated by the vectors of the five-year intervals between 1960 and 
1985, over time, there appears to be convergence between the turnover per- 
formance of the manufacturing sector and the performance of the transport 
systems. This is particularly reflected by the percentage of goods not trans- 
ported by railways along the performance frontier shown in Figure 21. In 
addition to being the driving forces for future improvements in the turnover 
of the manufacturing sector, inventory minimization and just-in-time pro- 
duction regimes also require higher quality of service in terms of high trans- 
port speed, fast pick-up and delivery, and smaller batch sizes. All this should 
favor truck transportation rather than rail. 
Developed economies are in a transitional phase with regard to their 
output mix, moving in the direction of information- and value-intensive, 
but material-extensive products. This dematerialization (i.e., increasing the 
value generated per kg material input) of manufactured goods is made possi- 
ble by the availability of higher quality and lighter substitutes in the form of 
advanced materials; and through the increasing value of products through 
higher software and information content.[l4] The implications of this for 
the transport sector are illustrated in Figure 22, where the share of different 
transport modes in the imported value of manufactured goods as a function 
of value density is reported for the FRG in 1986. In 1986 imports of manu- 
factured goods into the FRG accounted for 424 billion DM for a total of 349 
million tons (i.e., an average value of 1.2 DM/kg). For the import value, 50 
percent arrived by truck, 7 percent by rail, 24 percent by sea or waterway 
vessel, 6 percent by pipeline and 10 percent by air (we cannot account for 
the remaining 3 percent). It is interesting to note that while trucks account 
for 50 percent they transported only 18 percent of the imported tonnage. 
For air transport this is even more extreme: 10 percent of the import value 
represent only 0.1 percent of import tonnage, resulting in an average value 
density of air freight of 166 DM/kg. Therefore the importance of the various 
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Figure 22. Share of different transport modes in the value of imported 
manufactured goods versus value density of products in the FRG in 1986, in 
percent of import value versus average product value in DM per kg. Source: 
Griibler (1990). 
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transportation modes changes significantly as a function of the value of the 
products shipped. 
Figure 22 illustrates that basic materials such as coal, gravel, scrap, 
and raw materials in the value range of below a few DM per kilogram are 
mostly transported by sea, canal, and rail. As the value of the products in- 
creases, trucks become more competitive and constitute the dominant trans- 
port mode in the value range up to 100 DM/kg. Most manufactured goods 
such as automobiles or machine tools fall into this range. Higher value 
densities, i.e., goods with values exceeding 100 DM/kg, such as electronics, 
computers or precision instruments, are usually shipped by air. Incidentally, 
the highest value manufactured goods (excluding precious metals, drugs or 
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caviar) are aerospace products and aircraft themselves, all exclusively trans- 
ported by air. 
Because of the increase in demand for high-value goods and just-in-time 
production regimes, the importance of air transport will grow substantially. 
In future, lower-value density products may also be transported by air. This 
is probably best illustrated by the case of the Cadillac AllantC, a car body 
manufactured by Pininferina in Torino, Italy and transported by air freight 
to  Detroit for final assembly of engine, power train, and electronics by Gen- 
eral Motors. This 5000 km L'production line" is apparently economic despite 
all the direct and indirect costs of potential damage risks, insurance, and the 
production inventories that would be locked in ocean freighters for weeks. 
The increasing importance of air transport for freight will most likely result 
in the additional collocation of production facilities and services close to air- 
ports, similar to industrial activities condensed along the previous transport 
infrastructures: first canals, followed by railways, and later on highways and 
roads. 
So far, we have discussed the transport system in terms of infrastructures, 
and the modal split for passengers and goods. We have shown that the long- 
term evolution of the transport system is characterized by a sequence of 
replacements in which faster and higher-quality transport modes substitute 
for traditional ones. The basic pattern identified appears invariant between 
different countries or even between different economic systems, pointing at  
deeper underlying long-term driving forces than normally enter short-term 
transport demand and mobility models (such as relative transport price 
structure, private car ownership rates, etc.). 
Passenger transportation, as a premium market segment particularly over 
longer distances, appears to  be a good indicator of the likely developments 
for lower-value market niches. The future evolution of the transport sys- 
tem will be shaped by the quest t o  increase speed, flexibility, and quality 
in transportation turnover. By analyzing the interaction between the differ- 
ent transportation modes we have concluded that these quality criteria are 
apparently best met by air transportation, followed by road transport. 
Through our analysis of the whole transport system and of various market 
segments we have described the competitive interaction between the individ- 
ual modes. The stage is thus set t o  concentrate on a more detailed analysis 
of individual transport systems in order to  derive a quantitative scenario of 
their future growth consistent with the structural tendencies revealed above. 
Proceeding by historical analogy we will first analyze the dominant trans- 
port mode of 50 years ago, the railways, introducing two important concepts 
in the growth of a particular infrastructure system: interrelatedness in the 
diffusion at  the international level, and heterogeneity in the ultimate realiza- 
tion (i.e., in density levels) of the expansion of particular transport systems 
between different countries. This will serve as an introduction for analyzing 
the diffusion of the automobile in more detail and for developing a scenario 
for the forthcoming global saturation of car diffusion, consistent with the 
above principles. 
4. Diffusion and Density Levels of 
Transport Systems 
4.1 Railways 
Railways were the major form of transport from the second half of the 19th 
century up to the 1930s. By the turn of the century railways had a dominant 
position in the transport sector of all industrialized countries, transporting 
between 80 and 90 percent of all passenger- and ton-km. Thus their domi- 
nance (a technological monoculture) in the transport sector was even stronger 
than is currently the case with the automobile. The takeoff of the railways, 
following the opening of the 20 km Stockton & Darlington Railway in 1825, 
illustrates the importance of the simultaneous and complementary charac- 
ter of transport infrastructure and technology development. The merging 
of the iron wagonway (introduced in the 18th century for coal transport in 
mines) and the steam engine as a new prime mover technology, facilitated a 
quantum leap in the performance and quality of the transport system. 
Railways spread over the whole world and their growth, in terms of kilo- 
meters of track constructed and in passenger and goods transport, has been 
so spectacular that economic historians have called the second half of the 
19th century the "age of the railways." If we analyze the growth of rail- 
ways at  the global level, we see that the growth process started in the 1830s 
and lasted around 100 years. When saturation occurred the length of the 
global railway network was around 1.3 million km; it has remained constant 
ever since. The main thrust of this growth was due to the development of 
extensive railway networks in a number of core countries, basically Europe, 
Russia, and the USA. The latter developed the largest railway system of any 
country. 
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Figure 23. Growth of the world's railway network (K 1.323 lo6 km, to 
1983, At 57 years). The length of the network has remained constant at a 
level of 1.3 million km since the 1930s. Source: Griibler (1990). 
The growth process of the railways enables us to check whether we can 
describe ez post their diffusion process in time and space,[l5] and in particu- 
lar whether simple growth and technological diffusion models are capable of 
anticipating the saturation level of railway expansion in the 1930s. Figure 23 
illustrates that railway growth at the global level can be described accurately 
by a simple three-parameter, logistic-equation model. The expansion of the 
global railway network proceeds with a At of 57 years and the inflection 
point, when half of the growth potential is realized and growth rates begin 
to level off until saturation is reached, occurred around 1893. Therefore, the 
saturation in the expansion of the global railway network could have been 
predicted as early as 1900. Of particular importance is the fact that the 
estimated saturation level of the diffusion process of 1.323 million km is very 
close to the empirical data of 1.3 million km. 
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Figure 24. Rise and fall of railway networks in the USA, the UK, and 
Germany (ERG after 1945), in fractional share of estimated saturation level, 
logit transformation. For model parameters see Table 1. Source: Adapted 
from Griibler (1990). 
Figures 24 and 25 illustrate that the growth process of the railway net- 
work a t  the country level and its contraction after saturation in the late 
1920s can also be described by the same model. The growth of railways 
in the USA, the UK, and Germany in Figure 24 proceeds at  a similar rate 
(where At  is between 55 and 57 years). Saturation is perfectly synchronized, 
the maximum size was reached in 1928 in the UK and in 1929 in the USA. 
In the German Reich, maximum network size was reached in 1913 and de- 
creased after World War I due to the return of ElsaB-Lothringen to  France. 
If we take this territorial change into account, we observe that railway con- 
struction continued in the remainder of the German Reich up to 1928, thus 
saturating at  the same time as in the USA and the UK.[16] 
Figure 25 shows the expansion and contraction of railroads in the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire (Austria after World War 1[17]), France, and the two 
growth pulses in Tzarist Russia and the USSR. While the growth pulses 
proceed at  similar rates for Austria-Hungary and France (At of 52 and 47 
years, respectively), the latecomer Russia grows faster (At of 37 years) and 
is, in effect, catching up. Again there is a high degree of congruence in 
saturation in the late 1920s. 
The interesting cases are France and the USSR since they show depar- 
tures from the development pattern of other countries. In France there are 
two features worth noting. The first is that the turbulence during the sat- 
uration phase is very large compared to other countries, primarily due to  
the impact of both World Wars; the second is the introduction of the TGV 
in the railway grid during the 1970s. Without the additional infrastructure 
dedicated t o  the TGV, the length of the French railway system continues to  
decline, while inclusion of the TGV links could indicate a trend reversal. As 
already discussed, the TGV might effectively be a transitional system to a 
new rail-based, high-speed infrastructure, and we have indicated this possi- 
bility by plotting the TGV lines separately in the lower right-hand corner of 
the graph. 
The development path of Tzarist Russia is almost identical t o  the pat- 
tern observed in the other five countries until the onset of saturation in the 
1920s, indicating (partial) integration of Russia in the development pattern 
of the rest of Europe (in fact a large part of the Russian railway network 
was constructed with French capital). The second expansion phase in the 
USSR doubled the railway network compared to pre-revolutionary times. In 
our interpretation this is an indication that, t o  a large extent, the USSR was 
decoupled from the development and economic growth pattern of the rest 
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Figure 25. Rise and fall of railway networks in Austria-Hungary (Austria 
after 1919), France, and the first and second phase of railway construction 
in Russia and the USSR, in fractional share of estimated saturation level, 
logit transformation. For model parameters see Table 1. Source: Adapted 
from Griibler (1990). 
of Europe. In retrospect this does not appear to  be an altogether success- 
ful model for economic growth and technological catching up. Interestingly 
enough, the second growth pulse followed a similar trajectory and time con- 
stant as the first one. The growth trajectory was strongly perturbated by the 
effects of World War 11, the disruption was however elastically reabsorbed by 
1960. Currently railway expansion in the USSR appears to be entering its 
own phase of saturation. Figure 26 summarizes the spread of railroads and 
associated technologies in a number of countries, including the six examples 
given above. 
The first cluster in Figure 26 shows a rather narrow band in the growth 
of railway networks, i.e., an international digusion bandwagon. This growth 
at  the world level was primarily due t o  construction, in a cluster of indus- 
trializing core countries in Europe and the USA. These countries display 
an interrelated and synchronized pattern in their railway construction, as 
expressed by their similar diffusion rates (Ats). Together the core countries 
of the railway bandwagon in Figure 26 account for the largest segment (70 
percent) of railways ever constructed. This implies that the particular de- 
velopment model, in the form of extensive construction of national railway 
networks, is not repeated by latecomers, i.e., by those countries not forming 
part of the particular infrastructure expansion bandwagon. 
As a result of synchronized development and of catching up, all core 
countries completed expansion in the late 1920s and the 1930s. This sea- 
son of saturations, i.e., they all saturated within ten years, is even more 
noteworthy when considering the long time period required to  build up such 
large pervasive systems: about 100 years. This season of satumtions is not 
limited to  the six countries discussed above. A quick look in the available 
statistics (Mitchell, 1980) suggests that a similar statement can be made 
for an even larger sample of European countries. All of them reached their 
maximum railway network length around the 1930s, including the Nether- 
lands (1929), Denmark (1932), Belgium (1933), Switzerland (1937), Sweden 
and Greece (1338), and Italy (1940). This provides further evidence for the 
clustering (season) of saturations observation presented above. The milway 
bandwagon was rolling for a large number of core countries, all saturating 
around 1930. No comparable growth in railway networks was later achieved 
in the countries decoupled from the core countries. 
The second band of trajectories in Figure 26 shows another important 
innovation in the railway system that diffused during the period when most 
of the wo~ld's railways were already declining: namely, the replacement of 
steam by diesel/electric locomotives. This development trajectory is again 
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Figure 26. Growth pulses in theexpansion of the railway network and in the replacemc~it of steam locomotives, 
in fractioilal share of growth (market share) acliievcd, logit tra11sformat;ion. Source: Griibler (1990). A U1 
confined to a rather narrow band that intersects with the second growth 
pulse of railways in the USSR. Figure 26 illustrates that. the replacement of 
the rolling stock, symbolized by the diffusion of diesel/electric locomotives, 
was much faster than the development of railroad infrastructures, with a 
At  in the order of 15 years, compared to  a At for the expansion of rail- 
ways of around six decades. In a similar way we observe here a substitution 
bandwagon, in that the replacement process appears to be an interrelated, 
synchronized phenomenon at the international level, completed almost simul- 
taneously by the end of the 1960s in all countries outside the USA, where 
the replacement was completed ten years earlier. 
Table 1 summarizes the data on railway expansion in the core countries 
of the railway bandwagon as well as on the global level. Estimated diffu- 
sion model parameters, in particular the saturation level K, are given with 
empirical data on the year and length of the maximum size of the railway 
network. The start of the diffusion process, defined as the year when the 
network extended over one percent of its ultimate level, as well as the year 
of saturation and maximum network size are also presented. Note, in partic- 
ular, the excellent agreement between the estimated saturation levels of our 
simple model and the empirical data (deviations below ten percent). The fit 
of the empirical data is also excellent (R2 in all cases is well above 0.99). 
As can be seen from Table 1, even the railway density between the core 
countries promoting this particular infrastructure development was, in fact, 
very heterogeneous. The resulting densities, i.e., the km railway lines per 
country area and per capita at the period when the expansion process was 
completed, were very different even between the countries promoting the 
most construction. Based on this historical example we may conclude that 
although the diffusion of infrastructure networks and systems, although com- 
parable in terms of their dynamics (Ats), resulted in different absolute as well 
as relative density levels. Different diffusion levels (densities) are the result 
of the diverse geographical, economic, and social environments (boundary 
conditions) prevailing in different countries. It appears in addition (see Fig- 
ure 27) that the ultimate density level also depends on when the system is 
introduced. Early pioneers in the introduction of railways, such as the UK, 
achieve the highest railway density levels. Latecomers, while sometimes 
catching up by growing faster, do not realize densities any way comparable 
to  the early starters. 
Consider the density levels presented in Table 1. The spatial railway 
densities range between 0.7 (USSR in 1986) and 16.0 (UK in 1925) km of 
railway lines per km2 of territory, i.e., by a factor of more than 20. Per 
Table 1. Growth of railway networks (km). 
Estimated Maximum 1% of 
sa tura t ion  length maximum Maximum  ensi it^* length in 1925 
length (K) achieved t o  At length length per 10,000 
Count ry  (3000 km)  (1000 km)  (year) (years) (year) (yeara) per 100 km2  inhabitants  
Austria-Hungarye 24.5 23.0' 1883 51.8 1841 1913' 8.0 10.2 
France 42.5 42.6 1876 47.1 1841 1933 9.7 13.7 
Germanyd 66.8 63.4' 1882 57.0 1841 1913' 12.2 9.6 
Russia 73.9 70.2' 1890 37.4 1851 1913' 0.3-1.5 4.8-8.4 
USSR 147.8' 145.6 1949 43.6 1921 1986 0.7' 5.5' 
u KJ 33.9 32.8 1858 56.6 1834 1928 16.0 8.8 
USA 526.1 482.7 1891 54.5 1840 1929 4.3 38.1 
Core countries in 1925' 715.0 2.0 16.7 
Rest of world in 19250 540.0 0.6 3.7 
World 1322.9 1255.0h 1893 56.9 1844 1930 1 .O 6.7 
'Important territorial changes thereafter. 
'Source: Mitchell (1980). 
*Density a s  calculated by Woytinsky (1927) for 1925 except Russia and the USSR (own calculation). The  range of figures for Russia 
corresponds to total density and the European part of the territory, respectively. Density figures for the USSR are for the 1986 
network size. 
'Austria after 1919. 
d~ncluding ElsaBLothringen (GL); excluding E-L, maximum network size was approximately 60 lo3 km by 1938. 
'Including intercept (73.9 lo3 km); 90% probability t h a t  K lies within 145-150 lo3 km. Density figures for 1986 network. 
'parameters refer t o  a Gompertz function (to = K l e  instead of K/2). 
gCore countries including Russia. Rest of the world is the difference between world total and core countries. 
"Source: Mothes (1950). 
Source: Adapted from Griibler (1990). 
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Figure 27. Spatial railway density envelope versus network construction 
start-up date, in km of railway network a t  peak year (1985, for networks 
still expanding) per 100 km2 of the country. Source: Griibler (1990). 
0.1 
capita railway densities range from 5.5 (1986 USSR) to 38.1 (USA in 1925) 
km per 10,000 inhabitants, i.e., by about a factor of 7. 
It is also interesting to extend our analysis to those countries that were 
not part of the railway bandwagon of Table 1 and Figure 26 with respect to 
ultimate density levels achieved in a particular infrastructure development 
phase. A number of developing countries continued railway construction 
after the saturation and contraction of railways in the industrialized core 
countries. In analyzing the diffusion level, i.e., the railway density per km2 of 
the country,[l8] of the railway latecomers, we observe an interesting fact: the 
diffusion levels appear to decrease the later a country started construction, as 
illustrated in Figure 27. Two empirical measures are developed to assess the 
starting date of construction. First, the year the network initially exceeded 
one percent of its final maximum size, using either historical dates or, in cases 
such as China where the network is still growing, the latest data year. The 
second measure records the date the first railway line of national importance 
was constructed. 
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Figure 27 suggests that the railway densities can be regrouped by a 
declining density envelope as a function of the date railway construction be- 
gan, i.e., the later a country started, the proportionately fewer railway lines 
it constructed. The only exception appears to  be Japan, where construction 
started rather late (in the 1870s) but a network of similar density as in the 
railway bandwagon core countries was constructed. 
Two main conclusions can be drawn with respect to  density levels. First, 
diffusion levels are different even within the core countries developing along a 
similar trajectory in various economic expansion periods. This is because of 
different boundary conditions prevailing in individual countries and the time 
available for development and growth. Therefore it is absolutely pointless 
to  infer from the diffusion level achieved in early starter countries (e.g., the 
UK for railways or the USA for automobiles) what would happen in other 
countries. The railway network of the USA was highly developed by 1930, 
but its spatial density was only one fourth of that of the UK. No one could 
seriously suggest that the railway network in any of the countries presented 
in Table 1 was not sufficiently developed by 1930. Still the diffusion levels 
(network density) were very heterogeneous even among the countries forming 
the railway bandwagon. 
The fact that the passenger car density in the USA presently exceeds 560 
cars per 1,000 inhabitants, does not imply that such a level is a good or even 
a desirable target for Austria or France. The heterogeneity in diffusion levels, 
and also in the technological and institutional design and embedding options, 
becomes even larger when considering a country that is not one of the core 
countries in a particular infrastructure development phase. Returning to  our 
example of the railway network densities we observe that China would have 
to  increase its present railway network by a factor of 20+ in order t o  achieve 
a spatial railway density similar to that of the industrialized core countries 
in the 1930s. This does not only appear infeasible, it also would be simply 
absurd to  suggest repeating[l9] a growth trajectory of a past development 
phase. We contend that a similar statement also holds true for the massive 
diffusion of car ownership to levels anywhere near those presently achieved 
in the industrialized countries. We will try to support this scenario by a 
more detailed analysis of automobile diffusion. 
4.2 Automobiles 
The advent of the automobile around the turn of the century initiated a 
new era in the development of transportation. Its growth, up to the present 
number of around 400 million passenger cars registered worldwide, proceeded 
through two distinct diffusion phases marked by different growth rates and 
a structural discontinuity in the 1930s. The automobile first diffused rapidly 
into the market niches previously held by horse-drawn carriages, where its 
comparative advantage was particularly high. This rapid diffusion was es- 
sentially completed by the end of the 1930s in all industrialized countries. 
During this early phase, the automobile did not enter into an effective 
competitive relationship with railways. In fact, cars had an essentially com- 
plementary role, improving the transport services to and from railway sta- 
tions and providing local distribution functions. Two developments mark 
the transition to the second growth phase: technological improvements in 
the car itself, in particular the introduction of closed car bodies, and satura- 
tion of railway expansion, both occurring during the 1930s. The saturation of 
the railways, in terms of infrastructure length and market importance, could 
have provided an opportunity window for the emergence of a competitor for 
long-distance travel in the form of the automobile. 
Before we discuss automobile diffusion in more quantitative detail, we 
first have to define what we mean by an automobile (car). The first cars were 
a long way away from the predominant technological design of today and can 
be characterized as "horseless carriagesn, often with open (and thus rather 
uncomfortable) bodies. Their structural design and construction material, 
axles, interior design and seating arrangements, steering design, etc., were all 
directly taken from horse carriage designs or direct derivates. This provides 
a clear picture of the market niche in which early automobiles competed: 
the automobile emerged and grew, by replacing horse-drawn vehicles. Even 
the new technology base of fossil energy as a fuel source was far from being 
standardized. In fact, four technological designs competed as prime movers: 
steam, diesel and gasoline engines, and electric motors. Once the dominant 
technological design emerged, however, mass production and significant cost 
reductions became possible. The most prominent example is of course Ford's 
Model T - the selling price was reduced from US$850 in 1908 to US$290 in 
1926 (Abernathy, 1978). Therefore, the technological and productivity stage 
for the diffusion of the automobile and the replacement of the horse carriage 
was set. 
Another factor contributing to the rapid first growth phase of the auto- 
mobile was that cars could make use of an already existing infrastructure 
developed for horse-driven carriages: surfaced roads. Contrary to popu- 
lar belief, the car did not enforce the construction of surfaced roads, as the 
growth of the latter significantly precedes the growth of the automobile fleet. 
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Figure 28. Passenger cars registered worldwide, linear and logarithmic 
scale. Source: Adapted from Griibler (1990). 
Finally, another precondition for the diffusion of the automobile was to  
overcome institutional and societal barriers. As an example we mention the 
abandonment of the 1836 Red Flag Act in the UK. This act (see Voigt, 1965) 
required a person with a red flag and a bell to walk 20 yards ahead of all road 
vehicles (at  that time only steam driven) to warn others. In addition, steam 
vehicles were not allowed to go faster than 4 km/hr. Yet another factor 
that prepared the social ground for automobile diffusion was the increasing 
awareness of the negative externalities resulting from the dense horse carriage 
traffic in urban areas: problems of congestion, energy (feed) supply, stabling, 
high accident rates, and environmental pollution from horse manu re (see 
Barker and Robbins, 1975, for an account of the road traffic situation of 
19th century London). 
Figure 28 illustrates the expansion of the automobile in terms of pas- 
senger cars registered at the world level, as well as for the USA and OECD 
countries outside the USA. Three important features are worth noting: 
The two growth phases are clearly indicated by the different slopes on 
the logarithmic scale. The first very rapid expansion phase lasted untjl 
the 1930s with an average exponential growth rate of around 30 percent 
per year; the second phase had a significantly slower growth rate of 5 
percent per year on average from 1930 to 1985. 
Prior to  World War 11, automobile growth was greatest in the USA; 
the shaded areas of Figure 28 indicate car registrations in OECD 
countries,[20] outside the USA and outside OECD (i.e., the difference 
between OECD and the world total), and clearly reveal the absolute 
dominance of the USA in the first phase of the diffusion of the automo- 
bile. Up to 1930 the USA accounted for as much as 80 to 90 percent of 
all passenger cars registered worldwide. By 1950 this share had fallen 
to around 76 percent, the remainder of OECD accounted for 16 percent 
and the rest of the world for around 8 percent of passenger cars regis- 
tered. Since 1950, the share of the USA has fallen to around 35 percent, 
while that of the remainder of OECD has risen to  about 40 percent of 
the world total. 
The share of countries outside OECD remains basically very small, be- 
low ten percent of the world total up to 1960. Since 1960 the share of 
countries outside OECD has risen to about 25 percent. 
In the first phase of diffusion, between 1900 and 1930, the number of 
passenger cars registered worldwide increased by more than four orders of 
magnitude to  some 30 million passenger cars, over 23 million of which were 
registered in the USA. The high automobile density in present day Amer- 
ica should not come as a surprise, considering the already high density of 
individual road transport means before the advent of the automobile. The 
density of riding horses and mules in the USA in 1900 exceeded 40 draught 
animals per 1,000 inhabitants, a value exceeding today's car ownership rate 
in Hongkong, and comparable to the present world average car density out- 
side the USA of around 50 passenger cars per 1,000 inhabitants. 
The second growth period of the automobile is characterized by its diffu- 
sion into those market niches previously held by railway transport, or those 
newly developing (e.g., leisure and weekend travel, commuting, etc.) in the 
post World War I1 period. In this period the other OECD countries started 
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Figure 29. Two diffusion pulses in the expansion of the number of passenger 
cars registered worldwide. [First pulse: K 35 million cars, to 1923, At  15 
years; second pulse K 464 million cars (including intercept),. to 1974, At 36 
years.] Source: MVMA (1987), for period prior to 1930 own estimates. 
mass motorization and since about 1960 car diffusion has also become sig- 
nificant in some of the COMECON and developing countries.[21] 
Figure 29 describes the two phases of automobile diffusion at  the world 
level for two diffusion periods and analyzes the growth of the number of pas- 
senger cars registered worldwide by two consecutive logistic growth pulses. 
The first phase is characterized by a regular, rather fast diffusion process 
(At of 15.4 years) which reached a saturation level of 34.6 million cars by 
1938. The downward deviation occurring after 1930 is the effect of the Great 
Depression. This deviation was, however, absorbed again by 1936. 
The second worldwide diffusion phase occurs in the period after 1950 
(by which date the effects of World War I1 had been overcome). This phase 
appears to proceed smoothly, and is characterized by a time constant twice 
as large as the first pulse (At of 36.2 years compared to 15.4 years). An 
interesting observation is that the post-1973 developments in the oil market 
did not appear to have a noticeable effect on the diffusion process. If the 
diffusion pattern continues to  unfold as in the past, saturation will occur 
around the year 2010 at  a level of around 464 million cars.[22] 
Based on an extrapolation of our nonlinear diffusion model, the growth 
of passenger car registrations worldwide appears to  be approaching satura- 
tion, with between 27 and 44 percent additional growth potential remaining, 
taking best fit and high estimate, respectively. Such a scenario would imply 
a progressive exhaustion of the economic growth stimulating effects of the 
expanding automobile industry, characteristic for the "oil and car" age. Be- 
fore we focus our analysis on a number of countries let us corroborate our 
hypothesis that automobile diffusion successively fills two market niches by 
analyzing how cars replaced horses and horse carriages as a means of road 
transport. 
The first  phase  of automobile  diffusion 
Before the advent of the automobile, the USA had a relatively high ownership 
density of individual road transport means in the form of horses and mules 
(around 40 transport animals per 1,000 inhabitants). From these initial 
conditions, the dominance of the USA in the first growth phase in the world 
automobile fleet and its present high car density may be better understood. 
By analyzing the number of horses and mules used for transport purposes 
(i.e., excluding farm animals) and the number of automobiles in use, a clear 
substitution picture emerges. Analyses for the UK and France show an 
identical pattern. When analyzing the relative share horses accounted for in 
the total number of road "vehicles", a regular logistic substitution pattern 
is revealed. 
The substitution of horses by automobiles is illustrated in Figure 30 
by plotting their respective absolute numbers, and the estimated numbers 
based on the logistic substitution model. The substitution process resulted 
in a decrease in the number of draught animals used for transport from 
four million in 1910 to less than 400,000 by the end of the 1920s, with 
a corresponding increase in the number of cars from 400,000 to around 23 
million over the same time period. By the time this substitution process was 
completed at  the beginning of the 1930s, the automobile density was close 
t o  200 passenger cars per 1,000 inhabitants. This is a value comparable 
to  the car density of present-day Japan (240 cars per 1,000 inhabitants in 
1987). This points again t o  the unique initial starting conditions for the 
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Figure 30. Number of draught animals (horses and mules) used for trans- 
port and number of cars in the USA, empirical data and model estimates re- 
sulting from logistic substitution model, in thousands. Source: NakiCenoviC 
(1986 and 1988). 
automobile age in the USA, therefore, making it unrealistic to use the US 
situation as a guide for similar developments in other countries. Figure 90 
clearly illustrates that the rapidity of the first growth phase of the automobile 
was largely due to the fact that it found and swiftly took over the existing 
market niche occupied by draught animals (At of around 15 years). 
Another observation that can be made on the basis of Figure 90, is that 
the total number of road vehicles (i.e., horses plus cars) appears to have 
evolved along an exponential secular trend with an average growth rate of 
above four percent per year since 1850. Note the congruence of the exponen- 
tial growth trends for the growth in the number of horses prior to the advent 
of the automobile and the continuation of this growth trend after the effec- 
tive disappearance of the horse as a means of transport by the 1950s. This 
observation would suggest an analysis of the diffusion of all road vehicles, 
irrespective of the replacement process between horses and cars occurring 
inside the total road vehicle population. If the evolution of the total number 
of road vehicles in the USA is analyzed under the hypothesis of a single 
diffusion process, i t  appears that the growth in the number of road vehicles 
proceeds after initial significant turbulences (but still along the long-term 
diffusion pattern) finally to LLlock in" in a regular evolution pattern along 
a long-term diffusion trajectory. The implications of this process, should 
i t  continue its historical trend, are particularly noteworthy with respect to 
the estimated saturation level of around 350 million road vehicles - this cor- 
responds to a doubling of present day figures and a resulting road vehicle 
density of over one road vehicle per inhabitant.[23] Although such a con- 
jecture would appear unrealistic based on present organizational patterns of 
car ownership and usage, there are some tourist areas where car densities ex- 
ceeding one car per inhabitant can be observed today. Could i t  be that such 
large numbers of additional road vehicles will be in the form of rental cars or 
similar organizational schemes to provide local and regional transport, with 
long-distance transport being provided for by other modes of transportation 
(e.g., aircraft or Maglevs)? 
We have analyzed and concluded elsewhere (Griibler, 1990) that the 
replacement of horses was practically complete in all industrialized countries 
by the 1930s, independent of what specific indicator was used to describe the 
process. The speed of displacement of horses in road transport was rather 
fast, with Ats ranging from around 15 years in the case of the USA, between 
15 (substitution measuring passenger-km) and 17 (substitution measuring 
ton-km) years in France, and around 20 years in the UK. This means, that 
within a period of one to two decades 80 percent of the stock of horses (and 
carriages) in the road transport sector was replaced. 
What are the driving forces behind such a rapid process of technological 
change? We would like here to put forward some tentative propositions. 
Clearly, a complex vector of comparative advantages of the automobile over 
the horse exists. Among these comparative advantages we rank in first place 
improved performance in terms of speed, range, and ease of use. Average 
transport speeds of automobiles increased quickly from around 30 to some 50 
km/hr. The average on highways was even faster, for 1940 an average speed 
of 60 km/hr is reported (US DOC, 1975), compared with some 10 km/hr 
typical for horse carriages. Higher speed and ease of use (no changing of 
horses during long-distance journeys) meant a considerable extension in the 
travel range which could be covered. Another aspect of ease of use of the 
automobile was a significant reduction in inventories and weight of energy 
sources [stables, storage of food - a horse consumes over 25 kg of food per 
day in the form of bulky hay, oats, etc. (Montroll and Badger, 1974)l. 
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Finally, one should not forget an additional advantage of the automobile, 
especially in urban areas: cars produced considerably less emissions than the 
previous dense horse population. Although the quality (toxicity) of emissions 
of automobiles and horses are of course different, the automobile nevertheless 
offered relief from one of the most urgent environmental pollution problems 
of urban areas around the turn of the century: horse manure. Montroll and 
Badger, 1974, estimate that a horse produces about 1,000 grams of excrement 
per mile traveled (635 g/mile solid and 300 g/mile liquid). This compares to 
1980 piston engine standards in the USA of around 5 g/mile (CO, NO,, and 
hydrocarbons). Thousands of so-called "crossing sweepersn were employed 
in London, who, for a halfpenny, would clean a path before anyone crossing 
the street. Today this may sound anecdotal, but i t  constituted a serious 
environmental problem a t  the turn of the century. 
We draw two conclusions from our discussion on the first phase of the dif- 
fusion of the automobile: (a) it was characterized by a process of substituting 
horse drawn vehicles, and (b) this first phase of the diffusion process was 
essentially complete by the 1930s. Technological improvements in automo- 
bile design, like the widespread adoption of closed body car designs, further 
improved performance, and comfort of automobiles prepared the ground for 
the second phase of the diffusion of the automobile, i.e., its emergence as 
a mass transport mode and the beginning of competition with traditional 
long-distance carriers, in particular the railroads. 
The second phase of automobile diffusion 
The diffusion of private car ownership for a number of countries will be dis- 
cussed below under two main assumptions. First, empirical evidence and 
similarities in the growth of earlier transport systems such as railways, sug- 
gests that the diffusion pattern closely follows a logistic trajectory. Our 
second assumption is based on conclusions from our analysis of the first 
phase of diffusion of the automobile. Since horses did not disappear as a 
means of road transport until the end of the 1930s, it is only after that date 
that one can consider the number of cars as an appropriate indicator for pas- 
senger road vehicles. Consequently (and further ignoring the disturbances 
resulting from World War 11) we analyze the second phase of diffusion by 
using data from the period 1950 to the present only. Diffusion will be ana- 
lyzed on the basis of both absolute and relative measures, that is the number 
of cars registered and the number of cars registered per 1,000 inhabitants, 
respectively. 
Table 2. Passenger car diffusion, 1950-1987,' in  million passenger cars registered. 
Passenger cars (million) 
Present Present R2 of 
Country t o  At K K-rangeb (1986-87) in % of I<' estimate 
Australia 1972 43.6 8.6 7.4-9.7 6.8 70-80 0.9996 
Austria 1972 27.6 2.9 2.6-3.1 2.7 85-94 0.9978 
Canada 1972 51.8 15.0 12.9-17.1 11.5 67-77 0.9969 
France 1969 33.8 23.8 21.4-26.1 22.0 84-92 0.9958 
FRG 1971 28.9 29.7 26.7-32.7 28.3 87-95 0.9949 
Italy 1973 25.7 24.6 22.1-27.0 23.3 87-95 0.9924 
Japan 1975 16.6 30.1 27.1-33.1 29.5 89-98 0.9993 
Spain 1976 21.2 11.1 10.0-12.2 10.3 85-93 0.9989 
Sweden 1965 32.4 3.4 3.1-3.7 3.4 92-100 0.9925 
New Zealand 1970 47.7 1.9 1.7-2.1 1.6 76-86 0.9965 
UK 1966 33.3 18.1 16.4-19.9 17.0 85-94 0.9977 
U S A ~  1970 59.7d 157.7 141.4-174.0 135.7 78-86 0.9985 
Worlde 1974 51.6" 463.9 403.6-524.3 364.8 70-79 0.9998 
OData period used for parameter estimation: 1950-1986/1987. 
'with 90 percent probability. 
'Range corresponds to high estimate and best fit case respectively. 
d ~ ~ o  growth pulses ( A t  = 14.4 + 45.3 years). 
=Two growth pulses ( A t  = 15.4 + 36.2 years, see Figure 29). Latest data available: 1984. World total includes centrally planned 
economies. 
Table 2 presents the estimates of the diffusion of passenger cars in a 
number of OECD countries, as well as the total for the world (including 
COMECON countries). We show the timing (inflection point to, i.e., at 
K / 2 )  and the duration of the diffusion process (At), the estimated ultimate 
level of saturation K, together with the corresponding uncertainty bands for 
the estimates (at 90 percent probability level). The next column gives the 
present actual car density (registered passenger cars 1986-1987). As can be 
seen from these figures, our estimates show that the automobile density is 
close to saturation in most of the countries and at the global level, ranging 
from between 83 and 100 percent of the estimated saturation level. In fact, in 
a few cases the lower uncertainty band has already been surpassed by actual 
density. For this reason, we will use the best fit and higher uncertainty band 
as representative figures in subsequent scenarios. 
A number of observations can be made from Table 2. First, the growth of 
passenger cars registered appears to be close to  saturation in all the countries 
of our data sample. The growth potential remaining is (with the exception of 
the USA and Canada) very small indeed for all OECD countries analyzed, 
whereas for the world, a figure up to  30 percent higher than at present 
would be expected based on our model. The second observation is the very 
large heterogeneity in both the diffusion speed (Ats ranging from 16 years 
in Japan to over 50 years for Canada and the USA) and in the remaining 
growth potential. Third, the diffusion rates (Ats) appear to  accelerate the 
later the diffusion process began. 
Both the diffusion rate and the level of saturation appear to be a function 
of when the diffusion process was initiated (measured by the year when one 
percent of the saturation level was reached, i.e., to minus At). Early starters 
grow slower and achieve higher ultimate density levels. But late starters 
have higher diffusion rates and therefore tend to catch up the leaders, albeit 
with a lower saturation level. This is exactly the same phenomena as seen 
for the spread of railways. For instance, the automobile diffusion process was 
initiated in Canada and the USA around the turn of the century, grew slowly 
(At around 50 years) but achieved very high car density levels as shown in 
Table 3. In Japan the diffusion process started some 60 years later, but 
because of higher diffusion rates grew faster (catches up with a At  of some 
16 years) and appears to be saturating at the same time as the USA and 
Canada but at a lower level. Table 3 complements the analysis reported in 
Table 2 by using the relative car density (passenger cars registered per 1,000 
inhabitants) as an additional indicator. 
Table 3. Passenger car diffusion, 1950-1987,a in passenger cars registered per 1,000 inhabitants.  
Passenger car density per 1,000 inhabitants 
Present Present R' of 
Country t o  At Ir' ~ - r a n ~ e ~  (1986-87) in  % of Ii" estimate 
Australia 1965 46.7 495.6 441.6-549.5 431.6 79-87 0.9990 
Austria 1971 27.2 366.4 330.0-402.8 336.0 83-92 0.9975 
Canada 1968 69.6 615.4 526.4-704.4 454.0 65-74 0.9924 
France 1967 34.5 422.5 380.6-464.4 394.0 85-93 0.9953 
FRG 1971 30.7 493.1 443.8-542.4 463.0 85-94 0.9941 
Italy 1972 26.1 426.5 384.0-469.0 408.0 87-96 0.9920 
Japan 1974 16.6 245.2 221.2-269.1 241.0 90-98 0.9991 
Spain 1976 21.9 283.9 255.5-312.2 265.7 85-94 0.9988 
Sweden 1964 32.8 401.8 362.0-440.8 401.0 91-100 0.9950 
New Zealand 1967 60.7 581.0 508.1-654.0 487.5 75-84 0.9946 
UK 1966 36.5 333.3 300.2-366.3 318.0 87-95 0.9895 
U S A ~  1970 5 7 . ~ ~  611.0 568.0-654.0 562.0 86-92 0.9950 
"Data period used for parameter estimation: 1950-1986/1987. 
*With 90 percent probability. 
'Range corresponds to high estimate and best fit case respectively. 
*Two growth pulses (At = 14.5 + 43.3 years). 
=Two growth pulses (At = 14 .2+ 19.9 years). Latest data available: 1984. World t o l d  includes centrally planned economies. 
In comparing Tables 2 and 3, one can conclude that the results of dif- 
fusion analysis using both absolute and relative measures are consistent. 
Differences in the estimated Ats for Canada, New Zealand, and the world 
total are the result of strong divergences between population growth and 
passenger car registration growth rates. We again point to the strong het- 
erogeneity in the ultimate saturation density levels that emerge from our 
analysis. Early starters such as the USA and Canada may reach saturation 
density levels as high as around 600 passenger cars per 1,0b0 inhabitants, 
whereas late starters such as Japan or Spain reach saturation density levels 
between 250 and 300 cars per 1,000 inhabitants. 
Figure 31 summarizes the diffusion envelopes resulting from our analysis 
- of the two phases of automobile diffusion in industrialized countries. The 
horse replacement and car diffusion trajectories are summarized by plotting 
the respective logit transformation of their logistic diffusion and substitu- 
tion curves. Together these diffusion curves represent international diffusion 
bandwagons, i.e., rather narrow bands, in which all the diffusion processes 
of the industrialized countries analyzed are confined. Figure 31 identifies 
two such diffusion bandwagons. First, the horse-replacement bandwagon, 
in which the diffusion rates are swift and very uniform in all countries. In 
fact the speed of replacement is similar to another process of technological 
change in the USA shown in the figure - diffusion of environmental control 
technologies, i.e., the replacement of cars without emission controls by those 
with catalytic converters.[24] This first diffusion bandwagon reaches satu- 
ration in the 1930s. The second one, consisting of the diffusion of passenger 
cars, is progressively converging towards the saturation period, showing a 
distinct acceleration for those countries starting motorization later. 
We have complemented Figure 31 by incorporating the diffusion trzjec- 
tories of other infrastructures and technologies representative of the "auto- 
mobile and oil age". These include the growth of surfaced road infrastructure 
in the USA and the USSR, oil pipelines in the USA, and the replacement of 
coal-fired steam ships by oil consuming motor ships. The associated large 
infrastructures of the "oil age" have tunneled through the first saturation 
phase of the growth of the automobile. In turn, these infrastructures appear 
to  be approaching saturation around the year 2000, in tune with the cluster 
of saturations in the growth of the passenger car registrations in all industri- 
alized countries. Presently, only the growth of surfaced road infrastructure 
in the USSR appears to have the potential to LLtunnel" through this season 
of satumtions. 
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Figure 31. Growth pulses in the expansion of the oillinternal combustion engine technological cluster in 
industrialized countries: replacement of horses, growth of automobiles and road infrastructure, oil pipelines, and 
diffusion of motor ships, in fractional share of saturation level or market share respectively, logit transformation. 
Source: Adapted from Griibler (1990), Griibler and NakiCenoviC (1987), and NakiCenovic (1988). 
Figure 31 therefore presents a condensed summary of the growth of a 
technological paradigm associated with the use of oil and the internal com- 
bustion engine as prime mover sources. The apparent start of saturation 
(i.e., the "growth to limits") of the largest part of this technological cluster 
is probably best characterized by the fact that the market share of oil as a 
primary energy source also starting saturating during that time. From such 
a perspective a major structural discontinuity in the evolution of a techno- 
logical paradigm responsible for much of the economic upswing after World 
War 11, appears consistent. 
The difference in the high saturation density of OECD countries com- 
pared to the world total (below 70 cars per 1,000 inhabitants) implies that 
most of the developing countries (with most of the world's population) will 
not reach car diffusion levels anywhere close to  that of developed countries. 
In order to corroborate this working hypothesis we have performed diffusion 
analyzes for selected COMECON and developing countries to investigate 
whether a similar saturation is imminent. Supported by empirical data, Ta- 
bles 4 and 5 show that this is indeed the case, implying that car diffusion in 
these countries will not "tunnel throughn the forthcoming saturation in in- 
dustrialized countries. This also makes our scenario of global car saturation 
at very divergent density levels internally consistent. 
We analyzed the diffusion of registered passenger cars in centrally 
planned economies and developing countries based on both absolute and 
relative measures. The diffusion trajectories from both measures are com- 
patible. It is also noticeable that the ultimate diffusion densities which may 
be achieved will be as heterogeneous, or even more divergent, as those emerg- 
ing from our analysis of industrialized countries. In general, the uncertainty 
of the estimated saturation level in these countries is higher than for indus- 
trialized countries (see in particular the much wider uncertainty bands for 
the estimated saturation level K). In most cases, this is because the diffusion 
process is not yet close enough to the saturation level to allow for a higher 
statistical certainty. In some of the countries analyzed, in particular, India, 
Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, we were not able to 
determine an estimate for the saturation level, as the growth process is still 
in its early (exponential) phase. This implies that the ultimate saturation 
level for these countries might be larger than the present car density by at 
least a factor of three. However, considering the present low density levels 
of passenger cars per 1,000 inhabitants in these developing countries, e.g., 
two for India, 11 for Thailand, and 16 for South Korea, even growth by a 
Table 4. Passenger car diffusion 1950-1987, in COMECON and developing countries: in million passenger 
cars registered. 
Passenger cars (million) 
Present Present R2 of 
Country t o  At K  range^ (1986-87) in % of KC estimate 
Czechoslovakia 1977 26.2 3.5 3.1-4.0 2.7 68-76 0.9942 
GDR 1976 28.6 4.1 3.6-4.7 3.3 71-80 0.9995 
Hungary 1979 21.3 1.9 1.6-2.1 1.5 73-82 0.9991 
Poland 1985 25.6 7.2 5.1-9.2 3.3 36-46 0.9980 
Argentina 1979 39.1 6.0 4.8-7.3 3.9 53-65 0.9970 
Brazil 1979 27.8 13.6 12.6-15.8 10.1 64-74 0.9986 
Mexico 1984 33.1 9.9 6.2-13.0 5.2 40-53 0.9768 
Nigeria 1979 14.4 1 .O 0.9-1.1 0.9 82-95 0.9934 
Taiwan 1988 20.4 2.8 0.3-5.9 1.0 17-26 0.9985 
Venezuela 1996 44.1 9.1 2.5-35.4 2.4 7-26 0.9994 
OData period used for parameter estimation: 1950-1986/1987. 
b ~ i t h  90 percent probability. 
'Range corresponds to high estimate and best fit case respectively. 
factor of three would not noticeably affect our average estimated saturation 
density of less than 70 cars per 1,000 inhabitants at the global level. 
Of the developing countries analyzed, only Venezuela appears to have 
a motorization pattern that allows for significant growth well into the next 
century. Venezuela appears to be an example of a country that started early 
and grew slowly to high density levels. Taiwan, on the other hand, is similar 
to Japan: both countries were late starters but caught up quickly as shown 
by their rapid At of diffusion. 
This brings us to the last level of our analysis: the substantiation of the 
global car diffusion scenario by an empirical test consisting of two charac- 
teristic observations in the pattern of car diffusion. We have observed an 
acceleration of diffusion speed and a decrease in ultimate diffusion levels as 
a function of the "learning time", i.e., the time period between the begin- 
ning of the diffusion process and the time available for growth (i.e., At). 
Figure 32 summarizes the results of Tables 3 and 5 by analyzing the rela- 
tionship between the length of the growth process of automobile diffusion 
(At), the ultimate saturation level of this process, and the time a country 
started motorization. The acceleration of diffusion for late starters is not a 
unique observation, we observed a similar relationship in the growth of the 
railway networks. Similar analyzes for the development of inland navigation 
and canals in a number of countries indicate an identical pattern (Griibler, 
1990). 
Perhaps the most striking finding that emerges from Figure 32 is the 
straightforward mathematical expression for the L'acceleration* phenomenon 
of diffusion in relating the log of Ats to the time period in which private 
cars achieved a one percent level of their saturation.[25] This functional 
relationship was first hypothesized by the late Ed Schmidt (1983). Schmidt's 
Law describes the acceleration of the diffusion rates of latecomers and their 
lower diffusion levels. Using linear regression, we arrive at the functional 
expression shown in Figure 32. The data confirm the acceleration tendency 
at a statistically highly significant level, and explain as much as 89.4 percent 
(R2 adjusted for degrees of freedom) of the variance in the observed data. If 
one extrapolates the catch-up tendencies, one arrives at  the conclusion that 
a country starting the diffusion of private cars now, would have a diffusion 
rate lower than ten years. Such rapid diffusion of car ownership appears 
quite infeasible from a practical viewpoint and could not in any case result 
in a significant growth of both absolute and relative car registration figures. 
We continue by analyzing the relationship between the estimated ulti- 
mate car diffusion level and the start of motorization. Early starters such 
Table 5. Passenger car diffusion 1950-1987, in COMECON and developing co~ntr ies ,~  in passenger cars 
registered per 1,000 inhabitants. 
Passenger car density per 1,000 inhabitants 
Present Present RZ of 
Country t o  At Ir' I{-rangeh (1986-87) in % of Ir" estimate 
Czechoslovakia 1977 27.0 225.9 196.1-420.0 173.5 41-77 0.9936 
GDR 1976 28.6 249.2 216.0-282.3 198.0 70-80 0.9994 
Hungary 1979 21.9 178.3 154.7-202.0 144.9 72-8 1 0.9990 
Poland 1985 27.3 194.7 136.2-253.1 112.1 44-58 0.9972 
Argentina 1975 42.2 173.3 149.0-197.6 127.0 64-73 0.9894 
Brazil 1977 32.4 96.7 83.6-1 19.5 74.0 62-77 0.9949 
Mexico 1975 34.5 87.7 76.3-99.0 65.0 66-74 0.9593 
Nigeria 1977 14.4 9.4 9.1-10.6 9.0 85-90 0.9855 
Taiwan 1986 20.3 112.G 63.0-150.0 54.0 36-48 0.9981 
Venezuela 1987 58.7 286.2 57.2-420.0 136.0 32-48 0.9919 
'Data period used for parameter estimation: 1950-1986/1987. 
b ~ i t h  90 percent probability. 
'Range corresponds to high estimate and best fit case respectively. 
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Figure 32. Schmidt's Law: Diffusion (growth) rates and densities of passen- 
ger car ownership as a function of the introduction date of the automobile. 
as the USA and Canada will have significantly higher car density satura- 
tion levels (above 500 passenger cars per 1,000 inhabitants) than countries 
like Hungary, Japan or Taiwan, where density levels of about half the level 
appear typical. The estimated regression equation of the declining density 
trend explains as much as 82 percent of the variance in the estimated satu- 
ration density levels of industrialized countries. 
Developing countries can be regrouped into three categories. Countries 
like Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico appear to follow the same declining den- 
sity trend as industrialized countries, albeit at a significantly lower level. 
Venezuela and Taiwan are midway between developing and industrialized 
countries. All the developing countries, however, seem to follow a similar 
declining density trajectory similar to industrialized countries. Only Nige- 
ria falls far below, indicating that motorization levels between developing 
countries will be even more divergent than in industrialized countries. In 
the same way that the USA does not provide a model for car diffusion in a 
country like Japan, car diffusion in Brazil or Mexico does not imply a real- 
istic model for Nigeria, India or even China. A density level of below ten 
passenger cars per 1,000 inhabitants appears more likely for these countries. 
The declining density envelope and the trend line of Figure 32 suggest 
that any country starting diffusion now with a rapid growth in the number of 
cars registered would progress greatly with respect to  the resulting diffusion 
levels. If we extrapolate the density envelope trends for the future, we arrive 
at the conclusion that an industrialized country starting motorization now 
would grow very fast (At of around ten years) but at the same time achieve 
a density level below 100 passenger cars per 1,000 inhabitants. Newly Indus- 
trialized Countries (NICs) may achieve figures close to our estimated world 
average of around 70 cars per 1,000 inhabitants, whereas "developed" de- 
veloping countries like Brazil or Mexico might achieve density levels in the 
vicinity of 20 to 30 passenger cars per 1,000 inhabitants should motorization 
begin now. For those developing countries that do not have the necessary 
initial conditions for motorization to take off (primarily in terms of dispos- 
able income), like India or China, even these values are probably an order of 
magnitude too high: these countries fall outside the diffusion density enve- 
lope and are not part of the automotive bandwagon shown in' Figure 32. We 
conjecture that within the next twenty years no car densities similar to those 
in industrialized or newly industrializing countries will emerge in developing 
countries such as China. 
We postulate, therefore, that the acceleration tendency in private car dif- 
fusion has two implications. First, it appears unlikely that a similar diffusion 
will occur in countries that are not part of the present diffusion bandwagon 
of industrialized and industrializing countries. The second implication is 
that, with very few exceptions, the expansion in passenger cars registered 
will approach saturation by the turn of the millennium. Based on such a sce- 
nario one could expect a significant structural discontinuity in the evolution 
of the world automotive industry, a transition phase that could well be ac- 
companied by a period of high market volatility and intensified international 
competition for survival in saturating markets. 
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The relative diffusion levels ultimately resulting from motorization are 
different between individual countries as a result of their different geograph- 
ical, economic, etc., boundary conditions, and the related accumulated "ex- 
perience" involved in the diffusion process. Our observation on the different 
car densities in various countries is consistent with the results of our analysis 
on the spread of the railways as the dominant transport mode prior to the 
automobile. 
Cars in the year 2010 
Table 6 summarizes the resulting scenarios of passenger car registrations 
derived from our analysis of passenger car diffusion. It regroups 1985 values 
and scenario ranges for the year 2010 by broad geographical regions based 
on the sample of 21 countries analyzed. For a better comparison with other 
projections we have also aggregated the 12 OECD countries analyzed (repre- 
senting 98 percent of all passenger cars registered in the OECD) as a proxy 
for industrialized countries, and the residual to our global projection as a 
proxy for the sum of developing and centrally planned economies (CPEs). 
The latter regional aggregate is limited, however, to the degree to which it 
is comparable with other projections usually made on an outside CPE basis. 
Our scenario suggests that passenger car registration at the global level may 
grow by the year 2010 to between 440 and 500 million. This is an increase of 
between 21 and 38 percent compared to the 1985 level. For Less Developed 
Countries (LDCs) and CPEs our scenarios project an increase to levels of 
between 120 and 150 million cars, i.e., between 54 and 92 percent of the 1985 
figures. 
Our scenarios are lower than other projections especially for developed 
countries as we have postulated different density levels, with latecomers 
catching up but not achieving levels comparable to the first countries that 
started motorization. For this purpose, we do not consider the USA or 
Canada to be a guide for likely future developments in other industrialized 
countries. Car density saturation in urban areas, zn increase in air trans- 
port for longer journeys, as well as the availability of new high-speed ground 
transportation systems, provide the rationale for our scenario of developed 
countries. 
For the rest of the world our scenarios still allow for significant growth, 
both in absolute as well as in relative (percent increase over present values) 
terms. Again we consider, however, that the growth of passenger car regis- 
trations will be very heterogeneous within developing and centrally planned 
Table 6. Scenario of passenger car registrations for the year 2010. 
1985 20 10 
Region lo6 cars lo6 population Cars/1000 lo6 carsa lo6 population Cars/1000 a 
North ~ r n e r i c a ~  147.2 264.7 556 169.4-187.4 303.1 559-618 
10 OECD Countriesc 141.9 427.0 332 153.7-169.1 458.6 335-369 
4 C P E ~  11.7 80.5 145 16.5-21.5 85.7 193-251 
5 NICsC 22.6 291.5 78 39.0-69.8 397.6 98-176 
World 364.8 4838.5 75 439.5-501.6 7015.9 63-71 
12 OECD Countries 289.1 691.7 4 18 323.1-356.5 761.7 424-468 
% of world 79% 14% - 71-73% 11% - 
LDCs and CPEs 75.7 4146.8 18 116.4-145.1 6254.2 19-23 
% o f  world 21% 86% - 27-29% 89% - 
"Range corresponds to best fit and high case respectively. 
*USA and Canada. 
'Australia, Austria, France, FRG, Italy, Japan, Spain, Sweden, New Zealand, and the UK. 
*~zechoslovakia, former GDR, Hungary, and Poland. 
=Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Taiwan, and Venezuela. 
economies. Different initial conditions, 'degrees of economic development, 
and the development of road infrastructures, explain the present diverse car 
ownership rates, even for similar per capita income levels. Countries like 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico or South Korea have per capita GNP values of 
a similar order of magnitude (between 2,000 and 2,500 1982 US$/capita in 
the Latin American Countries and 1,530 1982 US$/capita in South Korea) 
whereas their car density levels differ by as much as between 64 and 124 
cars/1,000 inhabitants in the Latin American countries and 16 cars/1,000 
in South Korea (1986 values). In our viewpoint, the diversity in diffusion 
levels will continue to  be a characteristic feature of developing countries. 
The high growth rates in the urban population in developing countries c d s  
for the construction of efficient mass transit systems for short-range travel. 
For long-distance travel, the growth potential for air transportation appears 
to be more consistent with the likely future developments in these countries 
than a linear extrapolation of the transportation trends of industrialized 
countries. 
4.3 Air Transport 
The evolutionary change in transport systems as described in the preced- 
ing sections indicates that faster modes are favored in long-distance traffic. 
F'urt hermore, the bulk of future growth in passenger and freight transport 
across continents and the globe is likely to  be absorbed by air carriers, espe- 
cially if economic blocks like Europe, North America, and Japan ultimately 
fuse to single functional entities. This suggests that a new growth pulse in 
commercial aviation and ground transport may be due in about two decades. 
Cruise supersonic and possibly air-breathing hypersonic aircrafts connected 
to maglevs might be the only technologies now on the horizon to provide 
the growth potential that could be required in the next expansion phase of 
passenger travel and freight services. 
Figure 33 documents the increase in air transport worldwide, measuring 
all operations and including centrally planned economies. Ton-km trans- 
ported by air include cargo, mail, and passengers (following IATA conven- 
tions, one passenger-km corresponds to 90 kg-km). A logistic function has 
been fitted to  the actual data and indicates that the inflection point in the 
growth of air carrier operations occurred around 1980. Thus, after a period 
of rapid exponential growth, about one doubling is left until the estimated 
saturation level is achieved after the year 2000 a t  around 290 billion ton-km. 
Figure 33 also shows the statistical uncertainty bands associated with our 
lo9 t-krn 
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Figure 33. Volume of air transport worldwide (including centrally planned 
economies) passenger, cargo, and mail, in billion ton-km transported, linear 
scale. Diffusion model parameters: K 289.2 lo9  t-km, to 1980, At  34.5 years, 
and uncertainty bands. 
estimate. The estimated saturation level, with a 90 percent probability, lies 
between 243 and 335 billion ton-km, and it is likely that the estimate will lie 
between the best fit and the upper value respectively, as the growth process 
has barely proceeded beyond the inflection point. 
Perhaps the most interesting result is that it took about 35 years for 
world air transport to reach the inflection point (about half of the estimated 
saturation level) and that within less than three decades the saturation level 
will be reached. This raises a crucial question: What could happen after 
such a saturation? 
The global fleet of commercial aircraft can be described in a number of 
ways. One obvious way of describing it is by the number of commercial 
aircraft in operation worldwide. This number increased from about 3,000 in 
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the 1950s to almost 10,000 in the 1980s. At the same time, however, the 
performance or carrying capacity and speed of aircraft increased by about 
two orders of magnitude. Thus, the size of the fleet is not the most impor- 
tant feature, because much of the traffic is allocated to the most productive 
aircraft operating among the large hub airports, while other aircraft consti- 
tute the feeder and distribution system for destinations with a lower volume 
of traffic. 
Figure 34 shows the improvement in carrying capacity and speed (often 
called productivity) measured in passenger-kilometers per hour. Each point 
on the graph indicates the performance of a given aircraft when used in 
commercial operations for the first time. The DC-3 was introduced in 1935 
with a performance of about 7,400 passenger-km/hr (21 passengers at 350 
km/hr); the Boeing 747 (B-747) was introduced in 1969 with a performance 
of about 500,000 passenger-km/hr (500 passengers at 1,000 km/hr). The 
largest planned B-747 (500 series) will carry almost 700 passengers. The 
B-747 family is therefore about a hundred times as productive as the DC- 
3 was 50 years ago. The upper curve in Figure 34 represents a kind of 
performance feasibility frontier for passenger transport. At any given time 
there appears to be only one appropriate productivity specification for long- 
range (most productive) passenger planes. All commercially successful long- 
range transport was introduced along this frontier. Figure 34 may also 
explain why Concorde was not a commercial success, which, despite being 
a technological marvel, significantly fell short of the productivity of the B- 
747 introduced around the same time period. The Concorde would have 
required around 250 passenger seats (instead of 100) in order to achieve a 
similar productivity level as a B-747 (i.e., an hourly LLthroughput raten of 
500,000 passenger-km). 
The saturation level of the aircraft performance curve is estimated to be 
about 1,200 passengers at subsonic speeds. A superstretched B-747 could 
achieve this level but this is probably the upper limit with regard to  any 
gradual change that is possible for the current generation of aircraft. Fur- 
thermore, the productivity of all passenger aircraft is confined to a rather 
narrow band between the performance feasibility curve, and a "parallel" 
curve with a lag of about nine years. This curve represents the growth of 
world air passenger-km transported, and is identical in its growth dynamics 
to the total air transport volume presented in Figure 33 above. The growth 
of air travel and the productivity of the best aircraft have, therefore, in- 
creased in parallel, indicating a consistency in the evolution of the global air 
transport system. 
Y Fraction F = - K 
Figure 34. Passenger aircraft performance, in fractional share of the esti- 
mated saturation level (1.2 lo6 million passenger-km per hour), logit trans- 
formation. Source: NakiCenoviC (1988). 
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Figure 35 compares the resulting estimate of total world passenger-miles 
transported by air by a recent Boeing market volume forecast. In addition 
our scenario of air traffic volume includes the USSR, so that the difference 
between the two scenarios is in fact larger than suggested by Figure 35. 
The reason for the lower estimate of future world air traffic compared to 
the Boeing forecast, is not only due to  the fact that we employ a nonlinear 
growth model (as opposed to  the linear trend forecast apparently underlying 
Boeing's projection), but also that our scenario takes the forthcoming satu- 
ration of future productivity increases of existing aircraft into consideration. 
w i t h  aircraft productivity saturating, future growth in demand could only 
be achieved by either large increases in the number of aircraft in operation 
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Figure 35. Volume of world revenue passenger-miles, Boeing market fore- 
cast, projection of logistic growth model (ultimate saturation level K 1,570 
billion passenger-miles, to 1982, At 33 years), and 90 percent probability 
uncertainty bands of logistic estimate, in billion revenue passenger-miles. 
or by a quantum leap in technology, similar to the introduction of the jet 
engine. 
The fastest airliner, Concorde, and the most productive jet transport, 
Boeing 747, both flew for the first time almost twenty years ago. Ever since, 
the volume of all airline operations h a .  continued to increase while the pro- 
ductivity of the B-747 increased only marginally through stretching. Most of 
the subsequent technological development focused on gradual improvements 
such as noise reduction and the improvement of fuel efficiency. Unavoidably, 
this leads to  an impression of diminishing returns in the further advancement 
of airliners and, consequently, the possibility of an approaching saturation in 
commercial air transport. An alternative view could be t o  expect an increase 
in the number or capacity of aircraft in order to  keep up with increases in 
the volume of traffic. Our analysis of the development of transport infra- 
structures and passenger travel indicates that large increases in the volume 
of operations are indeed likely. This is because air transpori continues to 
take larger shares of traffic and total passenger-kilometers traveled world- 
wide with an increase in economic growth. If we consider current airport 
overcongestion and the many inconveniences associated with an increase in 
the size of aircraft, the likelihood of hyperjumbos being developed with a 
capacity of a few thousand passengers is slim. A third possibility out of this 
stalemate could be an increase in productivity of the fleet by increasing air- 
craft speed; this would represent a revolutionary change in technology and 
a whole host of possible positive and negative externalities. 
Another alternative, which could result in increases in commercial air 
transport well into the next century, might materialize if the renewed re- 
search programs in advanced, high-speed airliners by the aerospace com- 
munities on both sides of the Atlantic bear fruit. Recently, plans were an- 
nounced to  study, and eventually develop, supersonic (SST) and hypersonic 
transport (HST). The most daring of the proposed designs could fulfill even 
more ambitious objectives and lead to  the development of an air-breathing 
spaceplane. 
Assuming that  such a development is technologically possible and eco- 
nomically viable, it poses a number of fundamental questions associated with 
the expected side effects of a large fleet of hypersonic passenger aircraft. 
Certainly, the noise problem must be overcome by both a reduction in the 
inherent noise profiles and the removal of hubs and routes for such aircraft 
from populated areas. A more important concern, however is the possible 
adverse effect of such a fleet on the chemistry of the upper atmosphere. In 
view of the observed ozone depletion of the stratosphere, such concerns are 
timely while the design and configuration of proposed hypersonic transports 
are still in an early development phase. Aircraft capable of operating a t  high 
Mach numbers would be powered by methane or hydrogen. At hypersonic 
speeds in excess of Mach 5, hydrogen would be the fuel of choice since, among 
other things, it would create the most environmentally benign emissions. 
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If possible adverse effects from the continued increase in transport op- 
erations could be overcome, the maximization of range through productiv- 
ity increases and speed would be consistent with the observed evolution of 
transport systems since the onset of the Industrial Revolution. Marchetti 
(1987) postulated that this evolutionary process will be complete when any 
place on the whole earth becomes reachable within an hour. A gigantic ecu- 
menopolis could be serviced by highly productive aircraft and maglev infra- 
structures, providing that such developments become socially acceptable and 
that the current prolonged phase of economic restructuring is followed by 
renewed growth leading to unprecedented levels of welfare. Perhaps an in- 
dicative precursor of this development is the deployment of B-747 aircraft 
for short-distance commuting along the Tokyo-Osaka corridor in addition to 
the Shinkansen rapid rail transport; in the not too distant future a maglev 
link could convert two metropolitan areas into a truly integrated hyperdty 
that could be traversed within an hour. The off-shore Kansai airport could 
then provide an extremely productive hub for long-distance, transcontinental 
travel. We will present below a Gedankenezperiment, showing the possible 
market response, if such high productivity transportation systems would 
indeed become available after the turn of the century. 
Let us now return to our discussion of the evolution of the world air trans- 
port market on a shorter time horizon in order to discuss what the likely 
regional disaggregation of our scenario of global air transport operations 
could be. Air transportation is carried out through a spatial hierarchy of 
long- to medium- term distances. Shorter-distance domestic or short-distance 
international flights, as in Europe, provide the necessary feeder functions for 
air transportation over larger distances on a continental or even transcon- 
tinental scale. Thus we consider that the growth rate that is realized at 
the higher spatial hierarchies of air transportation will result in equivalent 
growth at lower hierarchical levels. To illustrate the complementary char- 
acter of long and medium distances in air transportation Figure 36 shows 
the evolution of the domestic and international ton-km transported by air 
(passengers included on the basis of 90 kg per passenger). 
Europe, with its many small countries and short distances in interna- 
tional air transport has been considered as functionally analogous to  domes- 
tic feeder traffic in larger geographical spaces such as North America. As can 
be seen from Figure 36, domestic flights (short to  medium distances) have, 
after initial predominance over long-distance international flights, reached 
parity with international air transport volume since the early 1970s. This 
supports the complementary character of short-, medium-, and long-distance 
lo9 ton-krn 
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Figure 36. Growth of domestic and international air transport volume 
(passengers, cargo, and mail), in billion ton-km flown, logarithmic scale. 
air traffic and we therefore propose a scenario for the future in which the 
growth of world air transportation will be divided equally between interna- 
tional and domestic destinations. 
As regards a regional breakdown in the volume of air transport, we face 
a serious data problem in that no consistent data on the regional disaggrega- 
tion of all air transport operations are available. For international, scheduled 
air traffic, IATA statistics allow the analysis of its evolution by major geo- 
graphical area (as reported in Figure 37). An interesting finding from our 
analysis is the stability in the regional breakdown of international air trans- 
port operations of IATA members. Only the share of Europe declines from 
around 20 percent of the market share in 1949 to  the present level of 12 
percent, but as discussed above, it is better to  consider European air traffic 
as a domestic air operation. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that despite 
the much discussed emergence of the Pacific rim countries, their share in 
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Figure 37. Share of different regions in scheduled international IATA air 
traffic. Source: IATA (1961 to 1987). 
international air transport volume has remained constant at a level of 20 
percent ever since the first time statistics were collected for that region. In 
the absence of available statistics and on the basis of Figure 37, we thus 
adopt a working assumption that the growth rates in air transport opera- 
tions will grosso modo not change significantly between broad geographical 
regions. 
Gedankenexperiment 
Based on our assumption that air transport will grow along a nonlinear 
trajectory, saturation in market volume could occur around the year 2015 
at a level which is about one third higher than at present. We have also 
discussed the fact that the next growth pulse in air transport could result in 
advanced technologies meshing the world's principal gravity centers into a 
single functional entity. A technological revolution such as the introduction 
80 
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Figure 38. Share of ship and piston and jet aircraft in transatlantic passen- 
ger crossings, measured by the fractional share of passengers transported. 
of aircraft capable of super- or hypersonic flight regimes would be of similar 
importance to the introduction of aircraft itself for long-distance travel. 
Once a new transport mode enables the extension of the spatio-temporal 
range of human activities, a very strong impact on travel demand can be 
expected. Figure 38 illustrates such a technological revolution in the trans- 
port sector: the replacement of transatlantic passenger crossings on ships, 
first by the piston-propelled aircraft and later jet aircraft. As can be seen 
from the figure, it took around 30 years to replace ships by aircraft. Figure 
39 shows the same process of technological substitution by analyzing the 
total number of passengers transported by the three technologies. 
The peak rate of transatlantic passenger crossings by ship occurred in 
the late 1920s with over two million passengers transported annually. The 
emergence of the piston-propelled aircraft reduced by half the number of pas- 
sengers crossing by ship, whereas the total market volume did not change no- 
ticeably. Thus, by the mid-1950s when jet aircraft were introduced, around 
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Figure 39. Number of passengers crossing the Atlantic by ship and piston 
and jet aircraft, empirical data and estimates based on logistic substitution 
model, in million passengers. 
one million people were crossing the Atlantic by ship and an equal amount 
by piston aircraft. Much more decisive, however, was the impact of jet air- 
craft on the number of passenger crossings. As can be seen from Figure 39, 
the market volume increased dramatically as a response to the availability 
of such a new, fast, and convenient form of transatlantic travel. Compared 
to its pre-introduction time the jet aircraft increased the market volume by 
a factor of 10 over 30 years. 
This increase in traffic flux by one order of magnitude serves as an illus- 
trative case to conjecture about the likely market response to the availability 
of a new air transport technology in the form of super- or hypersonic aircraft. 
A new growth pulse in air transport traffic, leading to levels at least one or- 
der of magnitude above our estimated saturation level of world air transport 
based on present technology, could emerge after 2010, i.e., about the time 
when conventional aircraft technology reaches its estimated saturation level. 
Such advanced air transport would however require new infrastructures in 
the form of hubs, appropriate feeder systems - either by advanced ground 
transportation technologies such as maglevs or regional feeder aircraft, and 
finally also new energy infrastructures, based on either methane or hydrogen 
as fuel. 
5. Implications for Energy Demand 
Future energy requirements for automobiles and aircraft will depend on their 
diffusion levels, usage, and efficiency of energy use. Our scenarios of future 
fuel demand for automobiles are based on their diffusion levels and a com- 
pound efficiency improvement rate consisting of specific energy requirements 
and changes in usage. We assume that the latter will be relatively small in 
the case of automobiles compared to  fuel efficiency improvements. In the 
case of aircraft, the diffusion levels are already expressed in terms of volume 
of all operations so that efficiency improvements represent fuel requirements 
per passenger- or ton-kilometer. 
The main feature of this scenario is that it is based on a gradual satu- 
ration in automobile diffusion and the volume of air transportation in the 
next century. In both cases the remaining growth potential is relatively 
modest until the year 2010. With respect to  1985 figures, the automobile 
fleet is expected to increase by about 20 to  37 percent, and the volume of 
air transportation by about 56 to 81 percent. The two ranges correspond to 
the two diffusion trajectories that we have called the best fit and high case, 
respectively. 
With this overall scenario of the future development of automobile own- 
ership and air transport we assume two alternative efficiency improvement 
rates. One is based on the long-term historical efficiency improvement rates 
that have prevailed in most of the industrialized countries, and the second 
corresponds to more vigorous efficiency improvements in the future. In ad- 
dition, we have estimated fuel demand for the year 2010 based on current 
fuel efficiency of aircraft and automobiles. We call these evolutionary, high, 
and 1985 efficiency cases. The first case corresponds to an annual efficiency 
improvement of one percent, the high case to  an improvement of 2.5 percent 
per year, and the 1985 reference case to no improvement at all. In all three 
cases we assume identical improvement rates for world regions, but due to 
the different structure of current energy requirements, fuel efficiencies, and 
future diffusion, the resulting aggregate fuel demands by the year 2010 por- 
tray different overall rates of change and consequently different patterns of 
fuel demands. 
The evolutionary case is based on the aggregate efficiency improvement 
rate in industrialized countries. The overall efficiency of converting primary 
and final energy to energy services has improved radically since the beginning 
of the Industrial Revolution. Some efficiency improvements resulted from 
improved technologies, others from substitution of old by new technologies, 
and finally some were due to changing consumption patterns. The extent of 
these changes and improvements can be expressed at an aggregate level by 
the amount of primary energy consumed per unit of gross national product 
(energy intensity). In most of the industrialized countries the overall energy 
inputs into the economy decreased at  an annual rate of about one percent 
over the last hundred years. 
Figure 40 shows the ratio of energy consumption over GNP for the USA. 
The average reduction in energy consumed in order to generate one constant 
dollar of GNP was about 0.9 percent per year over the last 180 years. It 
shows that a regular decline in energy intensity for the whole economy pre- 
vailed over a long period in history, indicating that energy conservation is 
a historical process that was rediscovered as a concept only'during the last 
decade. This decrease in energy intensity fluctuated considerably around the 
decreasing secular trend of 0.9 percent per year. In fact, there are clearly 
visible periods when the amount of energy needed per unit of value added 
increased, while in other periods the rate of decrease appears to have ac- 
celerated. Figure 40 shows that the major periods without longer-term 
improvements in energy intensity occurred in the 1820s, 1900 to 1920, and 
most recently, from about 1945 to the early 1970s. After the OPEC oil 
embargo another phase in improving energy efficiencies was initiated. Since 
1973, the decrease in energy intensity in the USA has been twice as fast as 
its long-term historical rate and almost three times as fast in Japan, with 
improvements in the UK, the FRG, and France somewhere in the middle. 
In contrast, the average improvement in energy intensity for the USA since 
1950 has decreased to the long-term average of 0.9 percent per year despite 
the great improvements since 1973! Apparently the rapid economic growth 
and expansion of the 1950s and 1960s retarded improvements in energy effi- 
ciencies at the level of the whole economy, and the accelerated energy savings 
Figure 40. Primary energy consumption per constant GNP in the USA 
from 1800 to the present, in KWyr per 1,000 1958 US$. Source: Updated 
from NakiEenoviE (1984). 
and efficiency programs launched after 1973 can be seen as a correction and 
reversal that brought the trajectory back to the historical average. While 
the other four countries use energy much more efficiently than the USA, 
relatiire improvements since the 1950s have been on the order of 1.3 percent 
in the UK and the FRG, about 1.1 percent (since 1960) in Japan, and about 
0.6 percent in France. 
This brief description of long-term efficiency changes illustrates that an 
improvement of one percent per year in our evolutionary scenario could in- 
deed be achieved in the future without any radical measures, i.e., they would 
not have to  be more radical than those achieved by industrialized economies 
in the past. In fact, this is not too far away from the actual efficiency im- 
provements achieved for cars and aircraft during the last decades. In the 
USA the average automobile fleet consumption was about 13.1 mpg in 1950. 
By 1985 the average efficiency of the fleet increased to about 18.2 mpg. This 
translates into an average improvement of about 0.9 percent per year and is 
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thus identical to the aggregate average for improvements in energy intensity 
for the whole economy. A similar improvement trend can be observed in 
other industrialized countries, e.g., one percent per year in France between 
1970 and 1985. Another example illustrates almost identical rates of fuel 
efficiency for aircraft in the USA: in 1950 the average fuel consumption was 
about 160 ton-km/gal and by 1985 this improved to 231 ton-km/gal (Bor- 
deron, 1989). This corresponds to a reduction in fuel consumption of one 
percent per year. 
While these may be typical aggregate improvement figures they are cer- 
tainly not representative for more revolutionary changes that characterize 
our high-efficiency scenario. For example, the replacement of horses by au- 
tomobiles improved the efficiency of road transport enormously. A horse has 
an overall efficiency of about four percent in converting feed energy (energy 
content of hay) to  mechanical energy, while the modern internal combustion 
engines transform the chemical energy in fuel to mechanical energy at much 
higher efficiencies; about 20 percent for gasoline engines and up to 32 per- 
cent for large truck and bus turbo-diesel power plants. This translates into 
an average efficiency improvement for road vehicles of about 2 to  2.6 percent 
per year over the whole period of 80 years. Furthermore, even less radical 
improvements achieved since the energy crisis were higher than the historical 
average of one percent per year. Incremental and cumulative improvements 
of automobiles since 1970 in the USA increased efficiency at a rate of two 
percent per year, from 13.5 to 18.2 mpg in 1985. In other words, the im- 
provements were very small between 1950 and 1970. Examples of relatively 
large improvements since the early 1970s abound. In South Korea vehicle 
efficiency has improved at a rate of 2.8 percent per year since 1971. 
The most fuel-efficient automobiles actually require less than half of their 
currently-designed efficiency level. A number of small Japanese cars such as 
the Daihatsu Charade, Subaru Justy, or Toyota Starlet have an average 
fuel efficiency of about 60 mpg. In addition there are a number of diesel 
passenger cars with lower fuel consumption. Most of the manufacturers have 
prototypes of the same size with even lower fuel consumption. The complete 
replacement of an automobile fleet takes about 30 years. Thus if we assume 
that all current vehicles will be replaced by twice-as-efficient vehicles in 30 
years this will lead to an implicit improvement of 2.3 percent per year. 
Air transport efficiency improvements have also been higher for individ- 
ual aircraft than our aggregate figure of one percent improvement per year 
suggests. Already today the best of the new transports consume about 15 
percent less fuel per passenger-kilometer than their model predecessors. For 
example, the new Airbus 320 and Boeing 757-200 consume at least 15 percent 
less fuel than similar aircraft of only ten years ago (e.g., Boeing 737-400 needs 
about 20 percent less fuel than the older version Boeing 737-200). However, 
these are all short- to medium-range aircraft, and are not representative 
of the whole fleet. Long-range aircraft efficiency has also improved substan- 
tially since the introduction of the jet. The Boeing 707 had fuel requirements 
of about 250 kg/seat for a 4,800 km range when it  was introduced in 1958 
as the most productive passenger transport. The most advanced long-range 
transport Boeing 747-500 will require about 120 to 150 kg/seat on a similar 
route. This represents an efficiency improvement of about 1.7 to 2.3 percent 
per year. 
In view of these impressive efficiency improvements in automobiles and 
air transport of between two and three percent per year, we assume a repre- 
sentative figure of 2.5 percent for the future annual reduction of specific fuel 
requirements in the high-efficiency scenario. This high improvement rate 
would change the average fuel efficiency of automobiles from the present 
world average of about 20 mpg to almost 40 mpg by the year 2010, and air 
transport fuel consumption from about 230 ton-km/bbl today to some 430 
ton-km/bbl in 2010. In the evolutionary scenario the fuel efficiency improve- 
ments are more modest a t  about 25 mpg for the global automobile fleet and 
about 300 ton-km/bbl for air transport by the year 2010. 
Table 7 summarizes the relative (i.e., compared to 1985 figures) evolution 
of transport energy demand resulting from the combination of our diffusion 
scenarios, the hypothetical energy demand based on 1985 efficiency rates 
(1985 eficiency scenario), and the two scenarios on future usage/efficiency 
improvements (evolutionary and high eficiency scenarios, respectively). The 
range of figures in the scenarios stems from the range in the estimated dif- 
fusion levels by the year 2010, considering the best fit and high estimate of 
the diffusion level, respectively. 
Taking our scenarios on forthcoming saturation in passenger car growth 
and later air transport, the hypothetical energy demand compared to 1985 
and with no further efficiency improvements (1 985 eficiency scenario) in the 
year 2010 would result in an increase in world automotive fuel demand of 
between 22 and 41 percent. The hypothetical world air fuel demand would be 
between 55 and 82 percent higher than in 1985. These hypothetical demand 
figures are, however, rather unlikely to emerge, as we can assume, with a 
high degree of probability, further efficiency improvements in the transport 
sector. 
Table 7. Diffusioil of passenger cars and air transport, and evolution of transport energy consumption relative 
to 1985 with three scenarios for efficiency improvements (rounded figures). 
1985 2010 energy demand index 
Diffusion levela Efficiency Energy demand 1985 Evolutionary High 
1985 2010 mPg index efficiency efficiency efficiency 
Auiomobiles 
North America 147 170-190 18 100 115-127 90-100 63-69 
Rest of OECD 142 150-170 26 100 107-118 82-89 57-64 
Rest of world 76 120-140 16 100 153-190 120-147 80-100 
Total 365 440-500 20 100 122-141 95-109 65-76 
Air transport 
World total 182 285-330 230' 100 155-182 118-141 82-96 
Airlcar enerny 100  126-129 
"Units: for automobiles 10' passenger cars, for air transport 10' ton-km. 
* ~ i r  transport efficiency indicator: t-km/bbl. 
In the evolutionary efficiency scenario (based on an average annual com- 
pounded usagelefficiency improvement rate of one percent) automotive fuel 
demand would remain practically at the 1985 level in the year 2010 (be- 
tween five percent lower and nine percent higher than in 1985) at the world 
level, whereas world air transport fuel demand would be between 18 and 41 
percent higher than in 1985. 
Finally in the high ef ic iency scenario (based on an average annual im- 
provement of the compounded usage/efficiency rate by 2.5 percent), our dif- 
fusion saturation scenarios, together with the significant reduction in specific 
energy requirements per vehicle or air ton-km, result in a drastic reduction 
in the world transportation fuel demand. The high ef ic iency scenario would 
imply that by the year 2010 automotive fuel demand would be between 24 
and 35 percent lower than in 1985. Even in world demand for aircraft fuel, 
the high eficiency scenario would imply a decrease in fuel demand of be- 
tween 4 and 18 percent compared to  the 1985 consumption level. 
Two characteristics are common to all scenarios. First, due to  the fact 
that the growth potential for air transportation is higher compared to the re- 
maining diffusion potential for automobiles, the relation between automotive 
and aircraft fuel demand would shift in favor of aircraft fuel. This shift in 
the relative transport fuel mix is, in all scenarios, between 26 and 29 percent 
over the 1985 ratio on the world level. Depending on the remaining growth 
potential of passenger car diffusion in different world regions this ratio would 
of course be higher in favor of aircraft fuels in countries where automobile 
diffusion is close to  saturation. 
The second characteristic common to all scenarios concerns the regional 
breakdown of automotive fuel demand. As a result of the different growth 
potentials remaining in various world regions, in particular the higher growth 
potentials remaining in the NICs and the CPE countries compared to  OECD 
countries, automotive fuel demand evolves differently in these regions. The 
differential resulting from our diffusion scenarios is accentuated by lower 
energy efficiency and higher use rates, resulting in higher specific energy 
consumption figures for the automobile fleet in these countries. 
The evolutionary efficiency scenario illustrates this situation more 
clearly. Whereas world automotive fuel demand in 2010 remains basically 
around the 1985 level, the situation is different as a result of automobile 
diffusion saturation in OECD countries. North America would have an au- 
tomotive fuel consumption somewhere between the 1985 consumption (i.e., 
a zero demand growth) level and about a ten percent lower demand than 
in 1985. The remainder of OECD, due to  its earlier saturation (combined 
with efficiency improvements), would see automotive fuel demand decreasing 
between 11 and 19 percent of the 1985 consumption figures. This no growth 
or even negative growth situation in OECD countries is in sharp contrast to 
developing and centrally planned economies, where automotive fuel demand 
would increase between 20 and 47 percent compared to 1985 figures. 
Even in the case of a combination of diffusion saturation and very high 
efficiency improvements, developing and centrally planned economies would 
see a slight reduction in their automotive fuel demand by 2010, ranging 
from no change compared to 1985, to 20 percent less demand than in 1985. 
OECD countries would, in the high eficiency scenario, have decreases in 
their automotive fuel consumption of up to  43 percent less than their 1985 
demand figures. This provides a clear illustration of the significant oil de- 
mand impact of scenarios combining forthcoming saturation in the diffusion 
of automobiles and ultimately also of air transport with vigorous efficiency 
improvement scenarios. 
6. Conclusions 
We have demonstrated that the long-term evolution of the transport system 
is characterized by a sequence of replacements in which faster and higher 
quality transport modes substitute for traditional ones. The basic develop- 
ment pattern identified appears invariant between different countries or even 
between different economic systems, pointing to  deeper underlying long-term 
driving forces than enter more conventional transport demand and mobility 
analyzes. We have shown that transport systems and their infrastructures 
evolved from an early development phase characterized by slow growth to  
a vigorous expansion phase that finally culminates in saturation; the pe- 
riod when change and transition to the next generation of transport systems 
occurs. 
Replacement processes proceed according to  a schedule that apparently 
defines the opportunity windows for the development of particular systems. 
In the leading countries, diffusion leads to a long, sustained period of devel- 
opment with all the characteristics of pervasive systems that lead to high 
adoption levels. In countries where adoption occurs later, growth proceeds 
faster but results in lower adoption levels. This catch-up effect induces si- 
multaneous saturation both in the leading and following countries, albeit 
at significantly different diffusion levels. As the evolutionary development 
path that follows saturation is based on fundamentally new techno-economic 
solutions, further development of the transport systems is based on new 
technologies and infrastructures rather than on a repetition of the growth 
paradigm characteristic of the previous development phase. 
The development of individual transport infrastructures and associated 
networks is a long process, lasting many decades. A further finding is that the 
future of the transport system will be shaped by the quest to increase speed, 
flexibility, and quality of transportation turnover. In the analysis of the 
interaction between the different transportation modes we have concluded 
that these quality criteria are apparently best met by air transportation, 
followed by road transport. As a consequence, the expansion of global air 
transport will be higher, growing by another 60 t o  80 percent during the next 
20 t o  30 years compared with a more subdued growth of the vehicle fleet by 
20 t o  40 percent during the same period. Such developments in global road 
and air transport could have significant impacts on oil demand. 
The resulting modest growth rates of air and road transport, combined 
with vigorous efficiency improvements of about 2.5 percent per year during 
the next decades would reduce the current motor fuel demand by up to  one 
third, while aircraft fuel needs would be only 4 t o  18 percent lower than at 
present. 
Notes 
[I.] The growth of roads significantly preceded the diffusion of the automobile, i.e., 
roads were built first for horse carriages as shown in NakiCenoviC (1988) and 
Griibler (1990). 
[2] We define At as the time interval between the achievement of one and 50 
percent of the saturation level K, i.e., in this example At = 30 years. Due to 
the symmetry of the logistic function, the same time is required for the increase 
from 50 to 99 percent of the saturation level. An alternative definition of At is 
the time interval between the achievement of the 10 and 90 percent level (i.e., 
the main growth period). In this case the value of At would be slightly different 
from the other definition, but for all practical applications both definitions can 
be used interchangeably. 
[3] The evolutionary path of successive replacements of traditional by new forms 
of development and economic growth, driven by the diffusion of technologies 
and institutions, and interlaced by economic restructuring and transformations 
in social relations is captured in the Schumpeter (1939) notion of long waves 
in economic development, i.e., a sea-saw like pattern of Kondratieff pulses of 
expansionary and recessionary (restructuring) periods experienced in market 
economies during the last two centuries (Kondratieff, 1926 and 1928). Rather 
than a process of continuous growth, long-wave theory supports the idea that 
growth itself comes in pulses stimulated by the appearance and widespread 
diffusion of social, institutional, and technological innovations, leading to new 
forms of organization of production, new products, new infrastructures, and 
even whole new industries. In the works of Freeman (1983), Mensch (1975), 
Marchetti (1985), Nakitenovif. (1984), and many others, conceptual and empir- 
ical descriptions of long waves, diffusion, invention, and innovation processes 
have been laid, albeit from different methodological and theoretical perspec- 
tives. For a comprehensive review of this line of research see van Duijn (1983), 
Vasko (1987), or Goldstein (1988). 
[4] The theoretical foundation for the use of this particular model is derived from 
the theory of product life cycles as well as from extensive research into the 
temporal and spatial patterns of the diffusion of innovations carried out in the 
fields of cultural anthropology, sociology, geography, and economics. Social 
learning theory and more recently also evolutionary economics confirm the 
logistic pattern of the spread and replacement of ideas and artifacts and the 
self-organizational nature of the process. The growth model considered is in 
its linear (logit) transform log (y/K - y) = b(t - to)  where K represents the 
asymptote (saturation level) of the growth process, b a growth parameter (for 
clarity defined as At ,  i.e., the time to grow from 10 to 90 percent of K )  and 
the third parameter to,  the inflection point (at K/2, where the growth rates 
reach their maximum in order to level off thereafter until saturation) locates 
the process in time. Ordinary nonlinear least squares algorithms are used 
to  estimate the model parameters from historical data. Uncertainty ranges, 
particularly for the saturation parameter K are obtained by using Monte-Carlo 
type simulation techniques, as standard statistical assumptions on parameter 
correlation and distribution do not hold for this particular statistical problem. 
Hence, uncertainty values are not necessarily distributed normally around the 
mean value of the estimate. Details of the estimation algorithms are given in 
Griibler, NakiCenoviC, and Posch (1987). 
[5] The model describes the evolution of the fractional shares, f ,  an infrastructure 
accounts for in the total length of all infrastructures by a set of coupled 1c- 
gistic market share equations. The fractions f are again not plotted directly 
but as the linear transformation of the logistic curve log f / ( l  - f),  i.e., as the 
ratio of the market share held by a given transport infrastructure over the sum 
of the market shares of all other competing infrastructures. Thus, the pres- 
ence of linear trends in Figure 4 indicates where the fractional substitution of 
transport infrastructures follows a logistic curve. A finding of a large number 
of studies is that the relative market share of competing technologies u s~a l l y  
follows a logistic trajectory. A simple model for two competing technologies 
was first proposed by Fisher and Pry (1971) and analyzes of hundreds of cases 
at  lIASA and elsewhere have since demonstrated the conceptual and empirical 
power of the model. In dealing with more than two competing technologies, 
we must generalize, however, the two variate Fisher-Pry model, since in such 
cases logistic trajectories cannot be preserved in all phases of the substitu- 
tion process. Every competitor undergoes three distinct substitution phases: 
growth, saturation, and decline. This is illustrated by the substitution path of 
rail tracks in Figure 4 ,  which curves through a maximum from increasing to 
declining market shares. In the model of the substitution process, we assume 
that only one competitor is in the saturation phase at any given time, that 
declining technologies fade away steadily at logistic rates, and that new com- 
petitors enter the market and grow at logistic rates. As a result, the saturating 
technology is left with the residual market shares (i.e., the difference between 
one and the sum of fractional market shares of all other competitors) and is 
forced to follow a nonlogistic path that joins its period of growth to its subse- 
quent period of decline. After the current, saturating competitor has reached 
a logistic rate of decline, the next oldest competitor enters its saturation phase 
and the process is repeated until all but the most recent competitor are in 
decline. A more comprehensive description of the model and its assumptions 
is given in NakiCenoviC (1979). 
[6] The quasi capital stock (excluding depreciation) is measured in constant 1980 
Canadian dollars, derived from cumulative investment data given in Haritos 
(1987) and Urquhart and Buckley (1965). Railway investment data prior to 
1850 were based on marginal railway construction cost estimates calculated 
from data from Urquhart (1986). 
[7] While the canal network of Tzarist Russia extended only over 800 km prior to 
the Revolution (connecting however an extensive system of natural waterways) 
the USSR has constructed over 20,000 km of canals since 1920. Remarkably 
enough, this expansion process can be described by an extremely regular logis- 
tic growth pattern (see Griibler, 1990) that is presently approaching saturation, 
indicating that no further expansion should be expected. This becomes more 
plausible considering the increasing (environmental) opposition to large-scale 
river improvement and canal construction inside the USSR. 
[8] The remarkably constant output of rail transportation, slightly above 10 billion 
passenger-mileslyear since 1970, should not come as a surprise. It is a typical 
situation for a transport mode at the end of its technology life cycle, preserving 
its last niche (commuting) and being kept alive by public subsidies. 
[9] This particular example provides a good ez post test of the forecasting capa- 
bilities of the competitive evolutionary model used here for organization of our 
empirical data base. The estimates as reported in NakitenoviC (1986) based 
on data up to 1980 turned out to be excellent forecasts. No market share level 
of any technology forecast for 1986 deviates more than four percent from the 
final actual data. 
[lo] Based on a logistic growth model with an estimated saturation level of 1.3 
1012 passenger-km, t o  in 1972, and a At of 39 years. We estimate a 90 percent 
probability that the saturation level of the present growth pulse will be between 
1.1 and 1.4 10'' passenger-km. 
[ l l ]  About ten percent of all passenger-km in F'rance in 1900 were traveled by 
bicycles and motorcycles, also for longer, intercity distances. Automobiles 
were entirely negligible (around 3,000 registered cars) in this early phase of 
growth of road transport. The data for bicycles and motorcycles are of course 
only first order magnitude estimates, but are rather on the low than on the 
bigh m e .  
This corresponds to around 135 passenger-km traveled and to around 47 kg-km 
transported (per unit of GDP in constant 1985 Francs) respectively. Assuming 
90 kg per passenger, passenger transport corresponds to around 12 kg-km (per 
unit of GDP in constant 1985 Francs), and total traffic thus to around 60 kg- 
km (per unit of GDP in constant 1985 Francs). Transport and communication 
accounted for around six percent of GDP in 1985. 
[13] The prevalence of passenger over goods transport elasticities is indicated by the 
shaded area in Figure 15. Note that due to the high uncertainty involved in 
the estimates of GDP during wartime periods, we have omitted these in Figure 
15. Historically we may conclude, that as a rule passenger transport growth 
reacted more sensitively to business cycle variations (with the exception of the 
post-1973 period). This emphasizes once more the noteworthy bifurcation in 
the behavior of the two elasticities in F'rance in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
[14] It is indicative that software already constitutes a major fraction (over 80 
percent) in military investments. Similar tendencies are also to be expected 
for the manufacturing sector, as demonstrated by Ayres (1988). 
[15] The spatial diffusion of railways again proceeds along a S-shaped trajectory, 
spreading out first through a hierarchy of innovation centers and from there fur- 
ther out to  the hinterland, as analyzed in detail in Godlund (1952), Marchetti 
(1987), and Griibler (1990). 
[16] Later increases are again a result of territorial changes, including the Anschlufl 
of Austria in 1938, and do not represent a railway construction effort. For 
the decline process of the railway network of the FRG after World War 11, the 
share of the FRG territory in the maximum railway network of the German 
Reich was taken as an initial condition for the model estimation. 
[17] As in the case of the ERG, Austria's share (Cisleithania) in the peak railway 
network of the Empire is taken as an initial value to calculate the decline 
process. The decline process proceeds a t  an extremely slow pace compared 
to other industrialized countries, i.e., with a At of some 200 years; this is 
probably due to the strong influence of railway trade unions in the Austrian 
political system. 
[la] Because of the strong population dynamics of these countries, per capita den- 
sities show even larger disparities with industrialized countries and are also 
decreasing for most developing countries. 
[19] This does not imply that developing countries should not construct any new 
railway lines. For the transport of low-value goods, say soya beans or iron ore, 
railways are an efficient and cost-effective transport mode for these countries. 
Our conclusion just refers to the fact that we do not consider the successful 
catching-up by these countries to rely in any way on the development of an 
infrastructure, which was so essential for the growth of industrialized countries 
in the 19th century. 
[20] In the absence of statistics on total car registrations in OECD countries, we 
use a proxy sample of 12 countries: Australia, Austria, Canada, France, FRG, 
Italy, Japan, Spain, Sweden, New Zealand, UK, and USA. 
[21] COMECON - Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Since 1989, because 
of the changes in Eastern Europe, COMECON as an institution is of less sig- 
nificance for the European members. Other members include Cuba, Vietnam, 
Mongolia, and the USSR. 
[22] We estimate that there is a 90 percent probability that the saturation level of 
the diffusion process will be between 404 and 524 million passenger cars. For 
comparison, in 1984 world passenger car registrations are estimated to amount 
to  364.8 million passenger cars (MVMA, 1987). The estimate includes the 
intercept (saturation level of previous growth pulse with 34.6 million cars). R2 
of the estimate is 0.9998. 
[23] As the diffusion process has presently progressed to  only 50 percent of the es- 
timated final saturation level, the statistical uncertainty involved in parameter 
estimation is substantial. We estimate a 90 percent probability that the satu- 
ration level K will be between 207 and 516 million road vehicles (1986: 176.5 
million). R2 of estimate is 0.9966. 
[24] This points to  the fact that the replacement rate of the "rolling stock" of the 
road transport fleet is much the same whether we deal with horses or cars. The 
average useful life of horses and cars is about ten years. 
[25] Figure 32 also includes the diffusion of total road vehicles in the USA (i.e., 
riding horses and mules and later automobiles) because of the high density 
of individual road transport means in the USA prior t o  the advent of the 
automobile. The high car density of the USA at present and the high ultimate 
saturation level can be better understood when considered on the basis of 
Figure 32. 
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